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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
WHY SUPPLIER INTEGRATION FAILS:  
A SALESPERSON’S PERSPECTIVE 
 
In a traditional relationship, a salesperson is the sole gatekeeper in the supplier’s relationship with 
a buying firm. Supplier integration (SI) suggests that each domain expert (e.g., engineering) of a 
buying firm should directly communicate with the supplying firm personnel, without passing 
through the traditional boundary spanner—a salesperson. Existing literature argues that such a 
multichannel relationship generates significant degrees of benefit (e.g., better product design, 
product innovation). However, SI may fail unless the salesperson accepts the disintermediated 
communication. The multichannel communication structure of SI may limit his/her role of the sole 
gatekeeper thereby causing his/her behavioral constraints.  
This dissertation aims to extend the existing SI literature by understanding a multichannel 
relationship from a salesperson’s perspective. This study understands how the work routine of a 
salesperson changes under a multichannel relationship, especially when an engineer of his/her 
company can also directly communicate with the buying firm. With the aid of some in-depth 
interviews with eight salespersons in a display industry, and with an inductive research approach, 
we have developed several propositions. These explain how SI changes a salesperson’s work 
characteristics and in what way such changes might affect his/her behavior. Based on these 
propositions, a set of testable hypotheses is established for an empirical study. These hypotheses 
are tested using (1) the survey data from the salespersons, and (2) the performance evaluation data 
from a manufacturer. 
The empirical study tests how SI affects an engineer’s and a salesperson’s behaviors (i.e., an 
engineer’s opportunism, his/her inadvertent benevolence, and a salesperson’s barricading behavior). 
Our results explain that SI triggers an engineer’s inadvertent benevolence—an engineer’s 
willingness to accommodate a buyer’s request without proper consideration for the consequences 
of the accommodation—which in turn causes a salesperson’s barricading behaviors to block SI. 
The barricading behaviors damage the supplier’s performance.  
For the implications, this dissertation addresses the root cause of SI failure, which might occur due 
to traditional boundary spanners (salespersons). Also, this research explains that benevolence—
which is essential for external collaboration—could cause internal behavioral constraints that 
damage the external collaboration. This means that SI causes internal behavioral constraints, which 
paradoxically, damage SI.  
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1. CHAPTER 1. Introduction 
As firms focus more on the core business, gaining and/or sustaining competitiveness 
increasingly relies on the core knowledge of the suppliers with whom they work (Schiele, Veldman, 
& Hüttinger, 2010). Thus, many firms integrate with high performing suppliers to obtain their 
knowledge, and thereby maintain a dominant position in the market (Vanpoucke, Vereecke, & 
Wetzels, 2014). Supplier integration (SI) is a process in which a buying firm communicates not 
only with a supplying firm’s salesperson but also with the other domain experts in the supplying 
firm (Fawcett, Ellram, & Ogden, 2006). Unlike a traditional relationship, in which a salesperson is 
the sole gatekeeper in the supplier’s relationship with a buying firm, SI suggests that each domain 
(e.g., purchasing, engineering, manufacturing, logistics) expert of a buying firm directly 
communicate with the personnel in the supplying firm, without passing through the traditional 
boundary spanner—a salesperson. The existing literature on integration argues that such a 
multichannel relationship generates significant degrees of benefit (e.g., better product design, 
product innovation, faster product launching). However, given that SI operates at the expense of a 
salesperson, who loses his/her position of being the sole gatekeeper, SI may fail, unless the 
traditional liaison (salesperson) accepts the disintermediated communication. Thus, investigating a 
salesperson’s behaviors in SI could help understand a failure in SI. 
However, no study has yet been conducted on a salesperson’s behaviors in the supply chain 
management field, and no SI scholar has paid attention to the role of the traditional boundary 
spanner—a salesperson—in SI. While some SI studies investigate a supplying firm’s opportunism 
(Yan & Kull, 2015), they focus on a firm-level opportunism. There is still little explanation about 
individual or functional-level opportunism, especially, a salesperson’s opportunism. In addition, 
the existing behaviors of the supplying firms result from transactional contexts, such as 
power/dependence, relational norm, or uncertainty between a buying firm and a supplying firm. No 
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study has explained a supplying firm’s or a salesperson’s behaviors, when involved in a 
multichannel relationship situation. This dissertation aims to understand a multichannel 
relationship from a salesperson’s perspective and investigates how the salesperson behaves under 
the new type of relationships. To this end, multiple research approaches were used.  
The second chapter helps us understand how the work routine of a salesperson changes 
when involved in a multichannel relationship, especially when an engineer of his/her company 
directly communicates with the buying firm. Because there is little explanation about a 
salesperson’s behavior in SI, a qualitative study is conducted using an inductive approach. With 
the aid of in-depth interviews with eight salespersons in a display industry, we developed several 
propositions that would explain how SI changes a salesperson’s work attribution, and how such 
changes affect his/her behaviors. Through this study, some very interesting concepts have been 
uncovered—inadvertent benevolence and barricading behaviors—that affect SI failure, 
encouraging an empirical study to test their associations with SI failure. Inadvertent benevolence 
is that an engineer accommodates a buyer’s requests without proper consideration about the 
consequences of his/her accommodations, and barricading behaviors are that a salesperson blocks 
the non-traditional boundary spanners (engineers) from accessing necessary information and/or the 
persons of a buying firm. 
The third chapter empirically examines how SI generates an engineer’s and a salesperson’s 
behaviors, which, in turn, affect the SI outcomes. Specifically, this study tests how an engineer’s 
involvement in a buying firm’s new product development (NPD) process (which is generally what 
buying firms do with their supplying firms for SI) affects the engineer’s behaviors (i.e., inadvertent 
benevolence and internal opportunism), which, in turn, influence a salesperson’s behavioral 
constraints (i.e., barricading behaviors) and the supplier’s performance. Based on the propositions 
developed in the second chapter, a set of testable hypotheses is established. These hypotheses are 
tested using (1) the survey data from the salespersons, and (2) the performance evaluation data 
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(supplier scorecards) from a manufacturer in the electronics industry. An engineer’s involvement 
into a buying firm’s NPD process gives rise to his/her behaviors, which a salesperson is concerned 
about. One of them is internal opportunism that the engineer takes advantage of, which is a 
boundary spanning role, to pursue his/her self-interest. The other is inadvertent benevolence, where 
the engineer accommodates a buyer’s requests without proper consideration of its consequences. 
These behaviors result in the salesperson’s behavioral constraints—barricading behaviors—a 
salesperson’s actions to block the non-traditional boundary spanners (engineers) from accessing 
necessary information and/or the persons of a buying firm (Murtha et al., 2011; Carter & Miller, 
1989; Fawcett et al., 2012). Due to such constraints, the buying firm fails to get the desired benefits 
from the supplying firm. Overall, this dissertation answers why SI fails. By understanding a 
multichannel relationship formed in the SI situation from a salesperson’s perspective, this 
dissertation can help us understand (1) a new work pattern or a set of characteristics that the 
salesperson experiences in SI, and (2) how the salesperson damages SI.  
For the two studies in this dissertation, we adopted the socio-technical system (STS) theory 
(Pasmore, 1988) in order to understand a salesperson’s behaviors in the multichannel relationship. 
Unlike many other theories which are traditionally used in SCM study, such as transaction costs 
economics (TCE), resource dependence theory (RDT), and social exchange theory (SET), all of 
which are useful to explain behaviors in a transactional context, the STS theory helps understand 
SI from a design perspective. By explaining the social and technical aspects of SI, this theory can 
explain why a salesperson’s behavioral constraints (social resistance) emerge in the newly designed 
communication pattern (a multichannel relationship).  
Throughout the chapters, the terms “a buying firm” and “a buyer,” have been used 
interchangeably when referring to a firm that purchases products/materials. The terms “a supplying 
firm” and “a supplier” have also been used interchangeably to talk about a company that sells 
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products/materials. In order to refer to employees in the firm, we mention “a buying firm’s 
salesperson,” “a buyer’s salesperson,” “a supplying firm’s engineer,” or “a supplier’s engineer.” 
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2. CHAPTER 2 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
For two decades, supply chain scholars have put great effort into understanding how to 
efficiently and effectively manage suppliers in order to respond to fast changing customer needs in 
the market, resulting in significant attention to SI in the literature (Leuschner, 2013). Unlike a 
traditional relationship where a salesperson is the sole gatekeeper for communicating with a buying 
firm, SI suggests that each domain (e.g., engineering, manufacturing, logistics) expert of a 
supplying firm is allowed to directly communicate with the buying firm without passing through 
the traditional boundary spanner (Fawcett, Ellram, & Ogden, 2006). By sharing sufficient 
information and doing joint planning in a timely manner through the highly integrated channels 
between a buying firm and a supplying firm (i.e., the buyer’s engineering-the supplier’s engineering, 
manufacturing-manufacturing, logistics-logistics), the focal firm (buying firm) as a whole can 
reduce unnecessary and/or erroneous work and thereby gain significant benefits (Flynn, Huo, & 
Zhao, 2010) such as a better product design (Petersen, Handfield, & Ragatz, 2005), faster new 
product launching (Parker, Zsidisin, & Ragatz, 2008a), product innovation (Koufteros, Edwin 
Cheng, & Lai, 2007a), and better financial performance (Droge, Jayaram, & Vickery, 2004).  
However, such benefits cannot be achieved without the cooperation of the traditional boundary 
spanners (salespersons) because SI is a process that allows a buying firm to develop and coordinate 
a multichannel relationship with its supplying firm at the expense of the traditional boundary 
spanners (i.e., salespersons) who would lose their traditional positions of being the sole gatekeepers 
(Fawcett, Ellram, Ogden, 2006). If they do not want to lose their influential power in the process 
of exchange and do not accept the disintermediated communication through the other channels, the 
SI would fail due to behavioral constraints of the traditional boundary spanners (Kull, Ellis, & 
Narasimhan, 2013). For example, although the salespersons could control their domain experts with 
information asymmetry by monopolizing information coming from an exchanging firm in the 
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traditional relationship, they may have no choice but to cooperate with the additional channels (e.g., 
engineering channel) in the multichannel relationship in order to understand what is happening in 
the engineering channel. If they do not accept the multichannel relationship, they may be 
uncooperative for the collaboration and try to maintain their own position of power (Murtha, 
Challagalla, & Kohli, 2011), with the integration ending up as a failure(Kull et al., 2013). Under 
the multichannel relationship, the traditional boundary spanners may experience some undesirable 
changes to their work routine, which limit their abilities to control information and weaken their 
social position within the organization. Understanding what those changes are would be important 
to understand a salesperson’s behavior toward SI, which enables an investigation of SI failure that 
results from a salesperson’s behaviors.  
Even though an intent of SI is to allow a buyer’s domain experts to form their own integrated 
channel with their respective counterparts in a supplier, and to effectively coordinate the established 
multi-channels, it is ironic that the literature on SI has ignored the existence of the plural channels, 
oversimplifying the channels by simply viewing a company as a unitary actor which speaks to its 
partnering firm with a single voice through a single channel (van der Vaart & van Donk, 2008). 
The oversimplification of the inter-organizational relationship makes it difficult to understand any 
of the issues associated with the multichannel relationship. Furthermore, few existing studies are 
investigating how SI impacts a supplier’s work processes or internal relationships (Stjernström & 
Bengtsson, 2004). We believe that this is because SI is designed for enhancement of a focal firm’s 
(i.e., buying firm’s) operational and innovative capabilities (Flynn, Huo, & Zhao, 2010), although 
there are some benefits for its suppliers (Lockström, Schadel, Harrison, Moser, & Malhotra, 2010). 
This leads to a preponderance of studies focusing mainly on a focal firm’s benefits from SI (Fabbe-
Costes & Jahre, 2008; Flynn et al., 2010; Mackelprang, Robinson, Bernardes, & Webb, 2014; van 
der Vaart & van Donk, 2008). Even when it comes to issues associated with barriers to integration, 
the literature is limited to internal issues and/or relational issues (e.g., functional silos, misaligned 
goal, lack of communication, distrust) from a focal firm’s perspective (Fawcett, Fawcett, Watson, 
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& Magnan, 2012; Fawcett, Magnan, & McCarter, 2008; Gleen Richey, Chen, Upreti, Fawcett, & 
Adams, 2009; Gleen Richey, Roath, Whipple, & Fawcett, 2010). However, one should be aware 
that a focal firm may fail to achieve the desired benefits from SI unless it is designed to provide the 
supplier with intrinsic motivation to be dedicated to the integration process (Monczka et al., 2005, 
p. 288). In order to elicit true support from the supplier, a focal firm should take into account issues 
and concerns that may occur within a supplying firm due to the integration process (Mortensen & 
Arlbjørn, 2012).  
To answer these unsolved questions in extant literature, this study conducts inductive case 
research using a grounded theory technique to develop a theoretical framework that explains how 
a multichannel relationship affects salespersons’ behaviors. With the support of the sociotechnical 
system (STS) theory that views a firm as an outcome of designing intangible things (e.g., 
employee’s mindset) and tangible things (e.g., practices and processes), this study answers the 
following questions: (1) what changes in work routines of traditional boundary spanners 
(salespersons) occur when involved in a multichannel relationship, and (2) how do the changes 
affect their cognition and behaviors?  
By answering these questions, this study contributes to both SI literature and the existing 
STS theory. First of all, a new perspective explaining why SI fails is provided. SI pushes a 
traditional boundary spanner—a salesperson—to give up his/her powerful position of the sole 
gatekeeper and to collaborate with new boundary spanners who are experts in other domains (e.g., 
engineers) (Carter & Miller, 1989). So, some problems could occur between a traditional boundary 
spanner and a newly added one (Murtha et al., 2011). By investigating how SI changes salespersons’ 
work or work process and understanding how the changes affect their social attributes, we show a 
new cause of SI failure—one that is rooted in the behavioral constraints of the salespersons. Second, 
this study sheds light on how SI practices actually affect a supplying firm’s internal processes. It 
articulates the negative impacts of a salesperson’s uncooperative behaviors on the relationship with 
his/her engineer. It is very important to investigate how SI practices affect a supplying firm’s 
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internal processes because any negative influence would reduce true support from a supplying firm 
(Schiele, Calvi, & Gibbert, 2012). By doing so, we can discuss an effective SI design which helps 
avoid its negative effect on suppliers’ internal processes to support buyers. As for the STS theory 
itself, this dissertation extends one of its boundaries by applying the STS theory in a new 
direction—the inter-organizational context. Specifically, by interviewing salespersons about their 
tasks in a multichannel relationship, we can understand how a new management practice (i.e., SI) 
influences their work technically and socially.   
 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.2.1 Integration in supply chain: social side vs. technical side 
Table 1 Supplier Integration Definitions 
Study SI definition 
Bowersox et al., (1999) SI is a practice that links externally performed work of the supplier 
into a seamless congruency within internal work processes 
Das, Narasimhan, and 
Talluri, (2006) 
SI is a state of synergy accomplished through a variety of 
integration practices among the supplier, purchasing and 
manufacturing constituents of an organization 
Swink et al., (2007) SI is the process of acquiring and sharing operational, technical, and 
financial information and related knowledge with the supplier to 
drive improvement and generate value 
Lockstrom et al., (2010) SI is collaborative efforts carried out jointly with suppliers in order 
to drive supply chain performance (e.g., cost reduction, quality 
assurance, delivery reliability) 
Lockstrom, Schadel, 
Moser, and Harrison, 
(2011) 
SI is an exchange mechanism between buyers and suppliers in terms 
of information, material, and cash flow. 
Vanpoucke, Vereecke, 
and Wetzels (2014) 
SI is the degree to which a manufacturer partners with its suppliers 
to structure inter-organizational strategies, practices, and processes 
into collaborative, synchronized processes 
 
In operations and supply chain management literature, integration has been a dominant topic 
for decades due to its importance in firm performance (Mackelprang et al., 2014). It has been 
interchangeably named as “collaboration” due to a collaborative facet of its definition which is, 
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“the degree to which a manufacturer strategically collaborates with its supply chain partners and 
collaboratively manages intra- and inter-organization process” (Flynn, Huo, & Zhao, 2010). 
Depending on the partner with whom a focal firm (buying firm) is integrated, it is specifically 
referred to as “customer integration” or “supplier integration” (Flynn et al., 2010). This dissertation 
focuses on the latter.  
Numerous studies define SI in Table 1. They argue that SI enables a firm to achieve faster 
NPD (Parker et al., 2008), better design quality (Yan & Dooley, 2013), reduced production and 
supply chain costs (Cousins & Lawson, 2011; Salvador & Villena, 2013; Das, Narasimhan, & 
Talluri, 2006), enhanced order fulfillment (Das et al., 2006; Tracey, 2004), and improved customer 
service (Swink, Narasimhan, & Wang, 2007). However, academic scholars and practitioners have 
realized that relatively few companies actually enjoy these benefits (Fabbe-Costes & Jahre, 2008; 
Mackelprang et al., 2014).  
Table 2 Barriers to Integration 
Author Barriers Technica
l Issues 
Social 
Issues 
Moberg et 
al. (2003) 
1. Lack of trust 
2. Failure to understand the importance of supply chain 
integration 
3. Fear associated with losing control 
4. Misaligned goals and objectives 
5. Poor information systems 
6. Short-term as opposed to long-term focus 
7. Supply chain complexity issues 
 
 
 
 
˅ 
 
˅ 
˅ 
˅ 
˅ 
˅ 
 
˅ 
Barratt 
(2004) 
1. Functional silos 
2. Lack of process visibility 
3. Information sharing issues 
 
˅ 
˅ 
˅ 
 
˅ 
Barki & 
Pinsonneau
lt (2005) 
1. Specialization barriers: barriers due to different perspectives 
concerning goals or frame of references among organizational 
units 
2. Political barriers: can create conflicts and power struggles 
 ˅ 
 
˅ 
Ellinger et 
al. (2006)  
1. Insufficient knowledge of the other function 
2. Lack of communication 
3. Poor working relationship 
4. Conflicting goals 
5. Lack of direction from senior management 
˅ 
˅ 
 
 
˅ 
˅ 
˅ 
˅ 
˅ 
˅ 
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Fawcett et 
al. (2008) 
1. Inter-firm rivalry: a misalignment of motives among allying 
partners 
2. Managerial complexity: a misalignment of processes, 
structures, and culture among partners 
 
 
˅ 
˅ 
 
˅ 
Glenn 
Richery Jr 
et al. 
(2009) 
1. Internal planning failure 
2. External monitoring failure 
˅ 
˅ 
 
Richey et 
al. (2010) 
1. Unidirectional: a one-way flow of process and planning 
2. Incongruent: conducting policy without consultation of 
partners or with little regard for the preferences of other entities 
3. Internalized: firms internalizing values, attitudes, or regulatory 
structures, such that the external regulation of a behavior is 
transferred into an internal regulation and thus no longer requires 
the presence of an external contingency 
˅ 
 
 
˅ 
 
 
˅ 
 
˅ 
Fawcett et 
al., (2012) 
1. Organizational structure & functional conflict 
2. Poor strategic alignment: goals & measures 
3. Lack supply chain leadership & know-how 
4. Resistance to change 
5. Insufficient trust/abuse of power 
6. Inadequate information: connectivity & sharing 
7. Inadequate alliance management practices 
8. Inaccurate forecasting & responsibilities 
9. Poorly defined roles and responsibilities 
10. Gap in education skills and human resources 
˅ 
˅ 
 
 
 
˅ 
˅ 
˅ 
 
˅ 
˅ 
˅ 
˅ 
˅ 
˅ 
 
 
˅ 
˅ 
˅ 
 
As you can see in Table 2, many scholars thought that SI failure results from the lack of 
technical capabilities to be successfully connected to suppliers (Fawcett, Osterhaus, Magnan, Brau, 
& McCarter, 2007), and they came up with such business tools and practices as Lean Six Sigma 
(LSS) (Pool et al., 2011), Joint Action (Heide & John, 1990), Early Supplier Involvement (ESI) 
(McIvor, 2004), Supplier Development (Krause & Ellram, 1997), and Collaborative Planning, 
Forecasting, and Replenishment (CPFR) (Aviv, 2001). However, they also found out that a 
misalignment in mindsets, such as trust, vision, or values, among parties who actually initiate the 
integrative practices mentioned above (Fawcett et al., 2008), is the root cause of the failure of 
integration. The conflict in the mindsets between a buyer and a supplier impedes the high level of 
integration that could generate a sustainable competitive advantage (Yan & Dooley, 2013). 
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Therefore, the social side integration, as well as the technical side integration, should be taken into 
account to understand a successful SI. 
By viewing SI as a process of designing a new organizational system between a buyer and 
supplier, Kull, Ellis, & Narasimhan (2013) provide a clear explanation about the meaning of 
technical and social integration. The former is to integrate two firms with an aligned technical 
system, “consisting of the tools, techniques, artifacts, methods, configurations, procedures, and 
knowledge used by organizational employees to acquire inputs, transform inputs into outputs, and 
provide output or services to clients or customers” (Pasmore, 1988, p. 55). The latter is to link two 
companies with an aligned social system consisting human attributes such as “attitudes, beliefs, 
relations, cultures, norms, politics, behaviors, and emotions” (Kull et al., 2013, p. 66). Therefore, 
by aligning its two systems with a supplying firm, a focal firm can achieve successful SI through 
which the desired outcomes can be gained.  
Similarly, several scholars point out the importance of both system integrations. For example, 
van der Vaart & van Donk (2008) found three aspects of integration by reviewing supply chain 
integration literature: (1) pattern (i.e., relationship with external partners) and (2) attitude (i.e., 
mindset toward partners), both of which are related to the social system, and (3) practices (i.e., 
technologies or business practices), which are pertinent to the technical system. The authors argue 
that all three factors must be considered in order to understand successful integration. Fawcett et 
al. (2007) recognize such importance by explaining “connectivity” (technical system) and 
“willingness” (social system). The importance of the social system for successful integration is 
amplified in Fawcett et al.’s study (2012) explaining that collaborative practices may fail due to the 
lack of social integration among collaborators. To conclude, a key point is that integration must be 
understood from the perspectives of both the technical and the social system. Firms would have a 
better understanding about a failure of integration by investigating the relationship between these 
two aspects of integration. 
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2.2.2 The Root Cause of Supplier Integration Failure: The Nature of Integration Practices 
Many scholars have tried to understand the relationship among the technical system, the 
social system, and the performance of SI (See Appendix 1). A majority of the studies focus on the 
relationship between technical system integration (e.g., process, systems, practices) and the 
resultant outcomes (operational and innovative performances, capabilities). Some try to extend this 
relationship by incorporating social system integration (e.g., trust, goal, close relationship). As 
examples of the former, Devaraj et al. (2007) explain that information technologies can support 
integration practices, which, in turn, affect a firm’s operational performance. Wong et al. (2011) 
empirically test the impact of the integrated processes and systems on a firm’s operational 
performance under environmental uncertainty, concluding that technical integration becomes 
important for firm performance under high environmental uncertainty. For the latter, on the other 
hand, Williams et al. (2013) shed light on the importance of social system integration for the greater 
effect of technical integration on firm performance. They argue that the extent to which supply 
chain visibility improves responsiveness relies on the degree of internally integrated goals and the 
extent of shared understanding between supply chain members. Besides, the social system 
integration alone can support better operational performance because the aligned social system 
enables firms to efficiently utilize acquired information and respond to the changing environment 
quickly. Oh et al. (2012) emphasize on a harmony between the “hard” and “soft” aspects of 
integration to gain desired outcomes from the integration. They demonstrate that while IT 
investments can improve a firm’s efficiency, such improvement would be greater when the systems 
are used by qualified employees who have a shared understanding of the firm’s strategy.  
As mentioned earlier, managing social aspects of integration is very important for 
successful SI performance because it helps firms achieve the technical integration, and more 
importantly, gain desired benefits from the technical integration. Generally, social issues can be 
classified into one of the three categories: (1) inter-functional and inter-firm conflict, (2) non-
aligned goals or visions and (3) unwillingness to share information (Fawcett et al., 2012). By 
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managing these problems through an integration of the social system within and/or across 
organizations, firms are eventually able to benefit from the integration. Petersen and Handfield 
(2008) call such an effort the “socialization process” through which a buying firm realizes the 
difference in social value, narrows the gaps, and jointly pursues the success of the relationship. 
However, an important point to note here is that the underlying assumption of those studies is that 
“technical integration is by nature is of benefit to a firm and does not cause any behavioral 
constraints, and the problems in the social system are “the result of opportunistic and malicious 
intention” (Kull et al., 2013, p. 65). These presumptions contributed to the literature about what 
causes a lack of technical integration, but it is still unclear what drives the misaligned social system.  
Recently, Fawcett et al. (2012) insist that social conflicts are an inevitable outcome of the 
technical integration process. In other words, as two firms initiate an integration process and 
thereby require inter-functional and/or inter-organizational interactions, they experience conflicts 
among the members involved in the interactions. Kull et al. (2013) further specify this argument 
by viewing the integration process as the process of designing a unified sociotechnical system 
between two organizations. According to their research, when an integration process changes work 
routines that a firm’s members previously followed and adhered to, behavioral constraints occur 
and hinder the effectiveness of the integration. For example, salespersons’ behavioral constraints 
may occur when integrated processes between firms decrease their bridging roles for their 
customers (Cho & Chang, 2008). Thus, we argue that the problems in the social system, which 
have been traditionally believed to be caused by opportunistic behavior and bad intentions, actually 
result from the process of technical integration itself. In the existing literature (see Appendix 1), a 
couple of studies try to touch on this point by empirically demonstrating that a well-designed 
sourcing practice leads to a closer relationship between a buyer and supplier (Bernardes, 2010; 
Koufteros, Vickery, & Dröge, 2012). However, it is still unclear why the practices end up 
influencing social integration. Therefore, it would be an interesting topic of investigation to draw 
the missing link (dashed line in Figure 1) in SCM literature through an investigation of what 
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technical changes in the course of integration processes actually affect the social system, which 
would influence integration performance.  
 
Figure 1 Unsolved Answer in Supplier Integration Literature 
 
2.2.3 Multichannel Coordination for supplier integration (SI) 
 
Figure 2 Single-Channel Relationship vs. Multichannel Relationship 
15 
 
 
Given that integration in a supply chain involves linking all processes of a focal firm to those 
of its exchanging firm (Flynn et al., 2010), SI enables each domain (e.g., purchasing, engineering, 
manufacturing) expert of a buying firm to coordinate, cooperate, and collaborate directly with its 
counterpart of a supplying firm (e.g., sales, engineering, manufacturing). Thus, unlike a traditional 
relationship where a salesperson is the only boundary spanner between a buying firm and a 
supplying firm, SI suggests that each domain expert from both firms is allowed to directly 
communicate without passing through the traditional boundary spanner (Fawcett, Ellram, & Ogden, 
2006). In other words, SI integrates with the partnering firm via multiple channels at the expense 
of the traditional boundary spanners (i.e., salespersons) who sacrifice their beneficial positions.  
As Figure 2 shows, in a traditional relationship (A), sales is the only channel (channel -1) 
through which the buying firm can contact the supplying firm and the in-charge of customer 
relationship management (Murtha et al., 2011). However, as the buying firm moves to a higher 
level of integration with the supplying firm, the relationship becomes a multichannel relationship 
(B). While this multichannel relationship allows the buying firm’s engineering to directly contact 
sales (channel 1-1), it also establishes additional channels (channels 2 & 3) for the buying firm to 
directly communicate with the supplying firm’s engineering regarding product specifications or 
technical skills (Parker et al., 2008a). Through these new channels, each domain expert in the 
buying/supplying firm can contact a supplying/buying firm easily, so that he/she can understand, 
discuss, and solve problems better without the traditional intermediator (sales). Such 
disintermediated communications facilitate shorter consumption of time to market a new product 
(Mcginnis & Vallopra, 1999), better design quality (Swink, 2000), project cost reduction (Primo & 
Amundson, 2002), and better technical performance of the product (Salvador & Villena, 2013).  
Despite the nature of SI that adds new contact points to a supplying firm, SI literature lacks 
an explanation of the dynamic mechanism between traditional boundary spanners (salespersons) 
and the new boundary spanners (i.e., a supplying firm’s engineers). Kull et al. (2013) have recently 
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pointed out the possible problems that might occur due to the addition of new channels onto the 
traditional relationship. For example, diverse channels in an inter-organizational relationship lead 
to diverse values within an organization (Sackmann, 1992 ), a weaker position of the traditional 
gatekeeper (Cho & Chang, 2008), and more importantly, conflicts among members within and/or 
between two organizations (Van Den Berg et al., 2014). The traditional boundary spanners should 
be in harmony with the new boundary spanners (e.g., engineers); otherwise, they may block 
information that needs to be shared with the new boundary spanners for better performance (Murtha 
et al., 2011).  
Such negative social outcomes are inevitable in the course of SI (Fawcett et al., 2012), but 
they can be mitigated by ex-ante and/or ex-post efforts to design SI appropriately (Kull et al., 2013). 
In order to understand what underlies behavioral constraints during an SI process, we need to view 
SI as the designing of a new sociotechnical system. 
 
2.2.4 Sociotechnical System (STS) Theory 
The Sociotechnical System (STS) theory was developed to refute “technological 
determinism where technology is the major causal factor affecting other organizational attributes” 
(Katz & Kahn, 1978, p. 279), that is, the existing paradigm presumes that the introduction of new 
skills, techniques, and knowledge would improve organizational effectiveness. However, Trist and 
Bamforth’s (1951) experiments suggest that work design based on joint optimization between a 
technology and the employees who use it can provide better productivity. In other words, the STS 
theory explains that the impact of a technology on organizational effectiveness can be determined 
only when we can understand how the technology fits with social attributes in the organization. 
The STS theory views an organization as a unified system that consists of two subsystems: 
(1) the social system that is “comprised of the people who work in the organization and the 
relationships among them” (Pasmore et al., 1982, p. 1183) and (2) the technical system that 
“consists of the tools, techniques, procedures, skills, knowledge, and devices used by members of 
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the social system to accomplish the tasks of the organization” (Pasmore et al., 1982, p. 1184). An 
organization will gain the expected benefits from adoption of new technologies and practices only 
when the new things (technical system) can mingle with the social system of the organization 
(Rogers, 1995), and such an alignment between the two systems is referred to as joint optimization 
(Emery, 1959). When an organization fails to implement joint optimization, it ends up experiencing 
unexpected social resistances and thereby organizational ineffectiveness (Fox, 1995; Kull et al., 
2013; Majchrzak & Borys, 2001; Pasmore et al., 1982).  
A fundamental objective of STS theory is that an organization should be designed to provide 
quality of work life (QWL) through joint optimization (Griffith & Dougherty, 2001). QWL 
demonstrates that “organizations must consider human needs in the design of work” (Kull et al., 
2013, p. 68). STS theory argues that joint optimization can be achieved through the redesign of the 
technical system to meet the needs of the social system as well as through the rearrangement of the 
social system for accommodating the new technical system (Pasmore et al., 1982). By investigating 
technical aspects that are misaligned with the needs of people and by solving the misalignment 
problem, STS theory enables a firm to achieve the desired effectiveness from the new technical 
system. Behavioral constraints are the resultant outcome of an organizational design that has 
overlooked this important principle (Cherns, 1987).  
According to STS theory, an organization that is formed to perform the tasks that 
individuals could not accomplish alone exists in the form of agreements among them (Barnard, 
1938). So, when changing the nature of an organization, these agreements may be broken and 
thereby some resistance might come in the form of behavioral constraints (Petersen & Handfield, 
2008). Therefore, when adopting new processes, procedures, and/or practices that change the 
technical system in the organization, an organization should examine how the changes in the 
technical system would break the existing agreements in the social system of the organization. That 
means that the firm should figure out how the organization’s members view the changes (Pasmore, 
1988). Given that SI shifts the nature of the inter-firm relationship from a traditional single channel 
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relationship to a multichannel relationship, it could damage a traditional agreement that only 
traditional boundary spanners (i.e., salespersons) share and distribute information within and across 
firms (Carter & Miller, 1989). Therefore, the traditional liaison may resist the new communication 
pattern. Such resistance should be controlled and managed beforehand by carefully managing the 
SI process. For example, if SI adopts a new, unfamiliar technical system, such as new information 
technologies (Venkatesh, Bala, & Sykes, 2010), a new working method (Trist & Bamforth, 1951), 
a new business practice (Kull & Narasimhan, 2010), or a new design for the work environment 
(Hyer, Brown, & Zimmerman, 1999), the existing agreement among organizational members 
(social system) might be broken and there might be some resistance to the new system. This is 
because these new systems break work routines that the members believe are the most effective 
and efficient. Eventually, the organization fails to gain the desired outcomes from SI (Kull et al., 
2013). 
However, in STS literature, few studies define specific dimensions of the technical and 
social system (Griffith & Dougherty, 2001), causing the principles to be abstract (Majchrzak & 
Borys, 2001). Recently, Kull et al. (2013) reviewed STS studies and introduced core features of 
STS that were commonly considered in the literature, and can be used for further STS theory 
building. We adapt their STS terminology in Table 3 to systematically conduct structured 
interviews as well as a systematic coding (Yin, 1994). 
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Table 3 Features of Technical and Social System (Adapt from Kull et al., 2013) 
 Feature Description of Feature 
Technical 
System 
(TS) 
Changes in 
Technical 
centralities 
The feature represents “changes” in terms of the dominance 
and importance of technical process when involved in a 
multichannel relationship 
Changes in 
Technical 
requisites 
This feature represents “changes” in terms of the 
surrounding conditions for technical functioning when 
involved in a multichannel relationship 
Changes in 
Technical 
proximities 
This feature represents “changes” that explain new physical 
layout, steps in process, and time association among workers 
when involved in a multichannel relationship 
Changes in 
Technical flows 
This feature represents “changes” in variance or sequencing 
of the stream of information, knowledge, and products when 
involved in a multichannel relationship 
Social 
System 
(SS) 
Change in Social 
position 
This feature represents “changes” in terms of the positions 
within the organization’s social structure (e.g., status and 
power) when involved in a multichannel relationship 
Change in Social 
value 
This feature represents “changes” in terms of the cultural 
attitudes, which influence how members behave, within the 
organization when involved in a multichannel relationship 
Change in Social 
association 
This feature represents “changes” in terms of the composite 
of functional memberships in organizations, which 
influences levels of cooperation when involved in a 
multichannel relationship 
Change in Social 
experience 
This feature represents “change” in terms of the 
understanding that results from social interactions (e.g., 
inherent attractiveness, emotions, justice, subordination, self-
worth, trust, social isolation, and endowments) when 
involved in a multichannel relationship 
 
 
2.3 METHODOLOGY 
2.3.1 Justification of Inductive Research Approach 
We adopt a grounded theory building approach to understand changes in the technical system 
that salespersons might experience when involved in a multichannel relationship, and to investigate 
how the technical changes drive the social system of salespersons (e.g., behavioral constraints) 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). There are three reasons why we adopt an inductive theory building 
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approach. First, even though STS theory allows us to sense how misalignment between the 
technical and the social system influences organizational effectiveness (Pasmore et al., 1982), it is 
difficult to draw specific, testable hypotheses from such an unsophisticated core principle (Spender, 
1996). While many STS researchers take for granted the fact that that employees (social system) in 
a supplying firm somehow face a new technical system (e.g., practices, procedures, process, etc.) 
and their social behaviors are the resultant outputs (Fawcett et al., 2012), a specific mechanism of 
the core principle is still under explored (Griffith & Dougherty, 2001; Kull et al., 2013). Suddaby 
(2006) argues that “grounded theory is best used when no explicit hypotheses exist to be tested, or 
when such hypotheses do exist but are too abstract to be tested in a logical, deductive manner.” (p. 
636). Second, since our study requires an understanding of how technical changes affect social 
attributes of participants in SI, we should investigate the subjective reality that the participants 
interpret about supplier integration, not the objective reality that a third party (a researcher) 
interprets. Grounded theory is best suited for our research (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Suddaby, 2006).  
Our research focuses on changes in work routines and characteristics of salespersons when 
involved in a multichannel relationship, and also salespersons’ behaviors that result from the 
changes. Even though many other domain experts from both companies contribute to the 
multichannel relationship, we narrowed the scope of our investigation to a salesperson’ view of the 
multichannel relationship because we are interested in a salesperson’ perception of the 
multichannel relationship which, in turn, might affect his/her behaviors. Therefore, our unit of 
analysis is a salesperson in a supplying firm. Because we focus on a salesperson’s behaviors driven 
by how he/she perceives the multichannel relationship, not by an objective reality of the 
multichannel relationship, we used a grounded theory approach to understand the reality that he/she 
interprets about the disintermediated communication pattern which is formed by SI.  
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2.3.2 Data Collection 
Unlike theory testing research that collects data with a randomized sampling technique from 
a defined population, theory building research allows researchers to choose samples for theoretical 
reasons (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1989), referred to as a “theoretical sampling method.” One of the 
important criteria for a sample selection of this approach is whether it could provide rich 
information regarding a research context and reflect research objectives (Fawcett et al., 2012). 
Usually, such samples come from “extreme cases” that facilitate an investigation of the dynamics 
in the defined circumstance by making hidden issues more visible (Barratt, Choi, & Li, 2011; 
Fawcett et al., 2012). In this sense, samples for our research context should be the cases in which 
we can clearly observe a multichannel relationship between a buying firm and a supplying firm, 
specifically including commercial (purchasing-sales) and technical (engineering-engineering) 
linkage between two firms.  
While every firm has a commercial channel, only the firms dealing with a complex and 
complicated product tend to have a technical channel (McCutcheon, Grant, & Hartley, 1997). Firms 
with the technical channel focus on core technology and outsource non-core parts of their products, 
closely communicating with their suppliers regarding product design and the production plan so as 
to make a good quality product (Mikkola, 2003). Also, a technical channel tends to be formed when 
firms are in a fast clock speed industry (Fine, 2000). Because firms in such an industry are in time 
based competition with competitors to gain a first-mover advantage (Lieberman & Montgomery, 
1988), they should have a shortcut for efficient communication and cooperation without bypassing 
middlemen. Those two conditions for the existence of technical channels (technological complexity 
and a fast NPD clock speed) lead to this dissertation’s sampling from the electronics industry. 
Similarly, Basole and Bellamy (2014) describe attributes of the electronics industry as those of 
possessing a high rate of technological change, high frequency of new product introductions, and 
shorter representation of lead times. Bellamy et al. (2014) explain that severe competition in the 
electronic industry puts greater pressure on firms to have and manage the technical channel with 
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their suppliers so that they can continually produce innovative products with the help of the 
knowledge and technologies from the suppliers.  
Deciding the number of samples for theory building is not an easy task. While some of the 
qualitative scholars advocate that fewer samples would be better for deep observation and 
comprehensive understanding (e.g., Voss et al., 2002), most of them argue that 4–10 samples would 
be the ideal number for developing testable propositions and securing external validity (Yin, 1994). 
Accordingly, we interviewed eight salespersons, and the selection process was as follows. 
 First, there was the task of contacting an electronics manufacturing firm, explaining the 
purpose and the expected benefits of our study and promising several pages of a summary of our 
study upon request. The firm that was selected, was located in South Korea. Second, with the 
support of this company, interviews were conducted with a couple of purchasing managers and 
engineers to understand their communication patterns and what they talk about with their supplying 
firms. This knowledge eventually helped later while interviewing sales representatives in the 
supplying firms. As a third task, purchasing managers were asked to identify supplying firms that 
were strategic partners and had intensive communication with respect to the techniques and/or 
products via the technical channel. Fourth, fifteen salespersons in the strategic supplying firms, 
identified by the purchasing managers, were contacted, and the objective and the expected benefits 
of our study explained to them, with a guarantee of confidentiality and a promise of delivering the 
final report upon request. Fifth, salespersons who showed an interest in the project were identified. 
Nine of these agreed to participate via a one-hour interview. Each of the nine interviews followed 
the protocol shown in Appendix 2.  
Prior to the actual interviews, unstructured interviews occurred with two persons from each 
role (i.e., a buyer’s purchasing manager, a buyer’s engineer, a supplier’s salesperson, and a 
supplier’s engineer) to understand the professional jargon and work processes among the four roles 
(Yin, 2003). Understanding their work and technical terms through this preliminary interview 
enabled us to communicate with the interviewees (nine salespersons) smoothly in the actual 
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interviews and, more importantly, to assist their recollection. These samples were excluded in the 
final analysis.  
Based on the preliminary interview and the Sociotechnical System theory (Kull et al., 2013; 
Pasmore et al., 1982), we developed the interview protocol for the salespersons (see Appendix 2). 
Once an interviewee agreed to participate, the interview protocol, with a brief overview of the 
research objectives, was sent via email to help him/her understand the research context and 
questions (Yin, 2003). Phone interviews were conducted, with each interview taking about one 
hour. The interviewer took notes during each interview, recording them with each interviewee’s 
permission so as to reduce any missing information while taking a note. To secure reliable raw data 
for the analysis, the interviewer cross-checked the interview notes with the corresponding recording 
after each interview.  
 
2.3.3 Data Coding and Analysis 
The finalized interview transcripts were individually analyzed by three academic researchers. 
Having multiple analysts for data analysis has two advantages. First, the use of multiple 
investigators leads to a better ability to handle a very large store of information from an interview 
(Barratt et al., 2011). Second, research reliability and validity can be improved by comparing 
outcomes among researchers and discussing their discrepancies (Gligor & Autry, 2012). In order 
to secure reliability and objectivity of our final conclusions, within-case analysis and cross-case 
analysis are implemented (Eisenhardt, 1989). Whereas within-case analysis enables a thorough 
analysis for each case, cross-case analysis helps a researcher draw a clear theoretical picture that 
reflects the similar patterns observed across cases (Eisenhardt, 1989), and to develop a more 
parsimonious model by focusing only on the patterns that are replicated across most or all of the 
cases (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Because the purposes of this dissertation research are (1) to 
understand the technical and social system of a salesperson in a multichannel relationship in 
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relation to a traditional relationship, and (2) to understand causal relationships between the two 
systems, a two-step approach is used, each of which includes both within and cross-case analysis.  
For the first step, each researcher examines the technical and social system of a salesperson 
within each case. To enable the initial coding stage, that breaks down the interview content into 
meaningful pieces—called open coding (Strauss, 1987), Kull et al.’s (2013) taxonomy (Table 3) is 
adapted. They provide several dimensions of the technical and social system that can be adapted to 
structure the analysis, facilitating a researcher’s open coding in an effective and efficient manner. 
In an inductive study, open coding is the most difficult task that could hurt inter-coder reliability 
(Gligor & Autry, 2012) because each coder has a different mental model with which the individual 
investigator interprets a phenomenon (Dougherty, 1992). Using Kull et al. (2013)’s dimensions of 
the technical and social system for the open coding facilitates the interpretative systems of the three 
coders to be aligned with each other and, therefore, it can secure better coding accuracy among 
three researchers. By doing so, the findings well reflect the characteristics of the technical and 
social system considered important in STS theory, making it possible to achieve external validity 
through consistency between the new theory and the STS theory (Barratt et al., 2011).  
Specifically, for a within-case analysis, three researchers independently coded the interview 
transcripts on a sentence-by-sentence basis and initially grouped the identified characteristics 
according to Kull et al. (2013)’s classifications (Table 3). Then, the three researchers sat together 
and compared the items in each classification of the technical and social system to check if all the 
items grouped into each dimension were placed in the appropriate dimension. After the initial 
categorization, they conducted intense content analysis within each classification to identify 
relationships among the open codes. By doing so, they could find several clusters that reflect more 
specific, practical concepts, which is the process of axial coding (Strauss, 1987). During this step, 
the items of each classification were grouped into a smaller concept or even moved to another 
classification identified after the open coding.  
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Then, a cross-case analysis was applied by comparing two cases at a time (Barratt et al., 
2011), and the coding tables were updated by either sorting the similar items into the established 
categories or by adding new categories when new items were identified. The final results are 
presented in Tables 4 and 5. Additionally, the same approach was applied to capture the benefits, 
problems, and solutions to mitigate the problems described by salesperson interviewees (Table 6). 
Selective coding was also performed for the technical system (see Table 4), which is the process of 
integrating and refining the categories identified at the axial coding stage (Gligor & Autry, 2012). 
This step allows for a focus on the core variable of interest and avoids an overwhelming number of 
propositions in the second step as discussed below. Every time any disagreement emerged with 
respect to the classification, the researchers returned to the interview transcript and carefully 
investigated it to reach a consensus.  
For the second step, the primary interviewer developed a causality model for each case to 
find the social system’s characteristics and the resultant behaviors driven by the characteristics of 
the technical system that was identified via the selective coding in the first step. Then, the other 
two researchers returned to each interview transcript and their own write-ups for each case in order 
to look for evidence of each causal model that the primary researcher had developed. This process 
facilitates a solid inter-rater reliability among the researchers (Fawcett et al., 2012). For a cross-
case analysis, the three analysts finalize the conceptual model by comparing models across cases. 
Additionally, to prevent an illogical leap to the outcomes based on the limited data, the three 
researchers followed a rule recommended by Barratt et al., (2011, p. 331), that “the researcher 
should select two cases at a time and compare them noting the differences and similarities and 
repeat this procedure until all cases have been considered.”  
This process of analysis, including the interview process, lasted six months. This process 
produced insights into the technical system that a salesperson is experiencing in a multichannel 
relationship, as well as a salesperson’s behaviors to mitigate the problems of a multichannel 
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relationship. The next sections continue with a brief overview of the findings and introduce several 
propositions derived from the cross-case analysis.  
Table 4 Open and Axial Coding for Technical System 
 Open Coding Axial Coding Selective Coding 
Technical  
Centrality 
S-engineering's encroachment 
on sales' traditional turf 
Decentralization of 
external work process 
Decentralized work 
process 
 Unfixed work starting process   
 Communication determined by 
who has well established social 
network with buyer 
  
 Supplier engineers sometimes 
initiate work process 
  
 Decrease authority   
 Loss of central position in 
product development process 
  
 Reverse information 
asymmetry between sales and 
s-engineer 
Decreasing information 
gatekeeping 
 
 Weakened information control   
 Decrease information control   
Technical 
Requisites 
Cross-checking unconfirmed 
information coming through 
multichannel 
Information cross-
checking 
Increasing work 
interdependence 
 Manage inconsistent 
information (e.g., filtering, 
validation) 
  
 Greater double/cross checking   
 Coordinating multichannel 
effectively (to generate a 
single, aligned voice to a 
buying firm) 
Coordinating interfirm 
activities 
 
 More attention to interfirm 
relationship (emphasizing on 
customer relationship 
management) 
  
 Greater coordination needs   
 Controlling interfirm transfer 
of sensitive information 
  
 May need to translate during 
direct communications of 
engineers 
  
 Needs to do much of work for 
our engineer working with the 
buyer 
  
 Monitoring s-engineer's 
activities 
Monitoring interfirm 
communication 
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 Needs to monitor direct inter-
firm communication of 
engineers and production 
  
 Education to help s-
engineering cultivate shared 
understanding (e.g., firm 
objective and strategic 
direction, and buying strategy) 
  
 More emphasizing on internal 
relationship management to get 
information 
Internal information 
sharing 
 
 Internal information sharing 
activities (e.g., email CC, 
meeting, IT system, report, 
etc.) 
  
 Engineers must share 
information with sales 
  
 Sufficient internal information 
sharing before contacts 
  
 Everyone reports all exchanges 
with buyer and shares with 
others who also work with that 
buyer 
  
 Sales doesn’t know about what 
is happening if they are not 
involved in the direct 
communication 
Increasing internal 
support dependence 
 
 If information is not shared 
with each other, some 
accidents must occur 
  
 If sales works with purchasing 
and b-engineer unit without 
knowing about what is 
happening in an engineering 
channel, we will be in trouble 
  
 Since S-engineers still need 
sales for their work, sales still 
need to do much of work for 
them.  
  
 Without sales, s-engineer 
focuses too much on technical 
issues, overlooking feasibility 
  
 Increasing frequency of direct 
communication between 
engineers increases needs to 
meet purchasing to finalize 
issues in the engineer’s 
discussion 
Increasing external 
support dependence 
 
 Buyer’s engineers need to 
contact us almost every day to 
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discuss all the issues about next 
year’s models 
 Increasing frequency of direct 
communication between 
engineers increases needs to 
meet purchasing to finalize 
issues in the engineer’s 
discussion 
  
Technical 
Flows 
High information inconsistency 
by buying firm or supplying 
firm due to multichannel (don’t 
know if true at the early stage) 
accuracy of input Increasing indirect 
communication 
 High information accuracy due 
to multichannel (later stage 
after cross check) 
  
 A large volume of unconfirmed 
information through 
multichannel 
volume of input  
 Direct communication between 
engineers 
Direct channel between 
engineers 
 
 Buying firm may initiate direct 
contact with engineers based 
on its need 
  
 Close work proximity between 
sales and b-engineering 
Direct channel between 
sales and b-engineers 
 
 Information exchange of sales 
direct with buyer engineers 
  
 Meet with buyer engineering to 
cross-check information 
  
 Buyer’s information is shared 
via sales 
  
 Buying firm may initiate direct 
contact with engineers base on 
its need 
Direct channel between 
purchasing and s-
engineers 
 
 Information exchange of 
purchasing directly with 
supplier engineers 
  
 Direct channels in a task force 
arrangement 
Direct channels in a task 
force arrangement 
 
 
Table 5 Open and Axial Coding for Social System 
 Open Coding Axial Coding 
Social  
Position 
Loss of influential power over the other 
functional units in the organization 
Decrease of sales influence 
internally 
 Decrease influence/control internally  
 Loss of influential power over the buying firm Decrease of sales influences 
with the buyer 
 Decrease influence/control with buyer  
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Social 
Values 
Importance of sales being as a filter Greater attention to 
information filtering between a 
buyer and supplier 
 Need for supplier engineers to adopt sales 
mindset 
 
 Importance of sales being as a harmonizer More-harmonizing attitude 
internally by a salesperson 
 Salesperson needs to give up pursuing own 
interests 
 
 Thinking of taking advantages of the 
multichannel relationship to obtain benefits 
from the buying firm (e.g., exposing prices to 
b-engineers and getting their favor for future 
business) 
Less-harmonizing attitude 
externally by a salesperson 
 Eagerness to show off external performance More egocentric attitude by a 
s-engineer 
 Pursuit of each boundary spanner's own 
interests 
 
 Increasing disagreement by a s-engineer on 
sales’ suggestions 
 
Social  
Association 
Amicable relationship between sales and b-
engineering 
Better interfirm relationship 
between sales and b-engineer 
 Better relationship between sales and buyer 
engineers 
 
 Amicable relationship between engineers Better interfirm relationship 
between s- and b- engineers 
 Better inter-firm relationships  
 Greater trust by buyer’s engineers  
 Amicable relationship between inter-firm  
 Conflict between sales and s-engineering Worse intrafirm relationship 
between sales and s-engineer 
 Greater internal conflict (e.g., due to 
inadvertent benevolence or disparities in 
knowledge levels) 
 
 Silo effect within the supplier  
 Need to enhance intra-firm sales-engineering 
relationships 
 
 Conflict between sales and purchasing Worse interfirm relationship 
between sales and purchasing 
 Worse relationship between supplier sales and 
buyer purchasing 
 
 Greater inter-firm conflicts result from 
inconsistent buyer voices 
Worse intrafirm relationship 
between purchasing and b-
engineer 
 Conflict between purchasing and b-
engineering 
 
  A Responsibility for cross-
checking for cross-checking 
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  A Responsibility for 
coordinating interfirm 
activities 
  A Responsibility for 
monitoring interfirm 
communication 
Social  
Experience 
Concern about s-engineer’s inadvertent 
benevolence 
Greater concern about s-
engineer's inadvertent 
benevolence 
 Concern about buying firm’s opportunistic 
behavior (try to get some sensitive information 
and desired things) 
 
 Concern about unrealistic project between 
engineers 
Greater concern about 
interfirm involvement between 
engineers in unrealistic 
projects 
 Concern about s-engineer’s negligence to 
share information with us 
Greater concern about 
insufficient information 
sharing by a s-engineer 
 Purchasing will be angry about direct 
communication between sales and b-engineer 
Greater concern about a 
worsening in relations between 
sales and purchasing 
 Sales doesn’t trust what purchasing insists  
 Purchasing really angry about sales’ 
noncompliant behavior 
 
 Increase engineers’ understanding about the 
technical issues 
Engineer’s better 
understanding about technical 
issues 
 Engineers can have deep knowledge on 
technical issues 
 
 Encourage direct communication because 
engineers are the experts who know our 
technologies and products 
 
 
2.4 FINDINGS  
2.4.1 Benefits and Problems of a Multichannel Relationship in Supplier Integration (SI) 
Table 6 Coding for Benefits, Problems, and Solutions 
 Open Coding Axial Coding 
Benefits Better information accuracy Better information accuracy 
and completeness 
 Better understanding technical issues/products  
 Effective tacit knowledge sharing  
 Less information distortion/omission  
 Share/develop deep understanding of 
technical issues 
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 Acquiring sensitive information of the buyer Better access to buyer-sensitive 
information 
 Sales can get more information by 
circumventing purchasing 
 
 Faster feedback for engineers’ questions Fast information sharing 
 Faster understanding by supplier  
 Buyer can give faster response to its 
customers’ needs for information 
 
 More business opportunities via an 
engineering channel 
Greater business opportunity 
 Decrease range of work activities Decrease workload of sales 
 Decrease sales workload because engineers 
handle technical issues 
 
 Fast NPD Fast NPD 
 Fast feedback during NPD  
 Faster new product development  
Problems Inadequate coordination of sales and buying 
firm’s engineering 
Problems due to sales and b-
engineer's interaction 
 Purchasing upset with sales when sales replies 
directly to buyer engineer 
 
 Negative performance due to the inadvertent 
benevolence 
Inadvertent benevolence 
 Increased costs caused by an engineer's 
inadvertent benevolence 
 
 Sensitive information leakage  
 Loss of potential business opportunities due to 
our engineer's inadvertent benevolence 
 
 “inadvertent benevolence” by engineers (too 
amicable relationships at individual level) 
 
 Engineering lacks negotiation mindset (makes 
inappropriate agreements) 
 
 Engineering too readily accepts responsibility 
for root cause of product defect 
 
 Projects can begin without consensus if 
supplier engineer initiates them (greater 
chance of failure) 
 
 Engineering reveals sensitive information (not 
an effective gatekeeper) 
 
 Information distorting, omission, and 
inaccuracy 
Inaccurate, incomplete 
information sharing 
 Inconsistent voices from buying firm   
 Challenge of producing consistent supplier 
voice 
 
 Generate inconsistent information  
 High project failure rate due to engineers 
pursuing too ideal project 
Pursuing infeasible project 
 Engineering ignores business/production 
feasibility 
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 Lack of understanding what's happening in 
the engineering channel 
Sales uninformed about what's 
happening in an engineering 
channel 
 Sales not kept well-informed about what is 
happening (dangers of missing information) 
 
 More internal conflict with engineering Greater internal conflict with 
engineering 
 Longer work lead time Higher workload of sales 
 Higher workload for sales  
 Slower work speed during preparation  
 Slower work speed because need to adjust for 
inconsistent information 
 
 Increasing NPD time due to inconsistent 
voices 
Longer NPD 
 Delayed NPD  
Behaviors 
to mitigate 
problems 
Security lock on the sensitive information Prohibit interfirm sharing of 
sensitive or pricing information 
without approval 
 do not share any information about price with 
our engineer 
 
 do not share pricing information with internal 
engineering 
 
 do not directly share pricing information with 
external engineering (share only with 
purchasing) 
 
 forbid sharing of some information with 
buyer, without sales or top management 
approval and share it only via sales 
 
 Defining specific topics for direct 
communication 
Define specific issues in which 
sales involvement is needed 
 Defining issues in which sales needs to be 
involved 
 
 Attending at the engineering meeting Real-time monitoring of 
interfirm communication 
between engineers 
 Real-time monitoring through email CC  
 Real-time information sharing via IT systems  
 Have sales present during inter-firm 
engineering and production meetings 
 
 Real-time formal monitoring of engineers-
participation or report 
 
 Sufficient internal information sharing Regular internal information 
sharing between sales and s-
engineer 
 Documentation of all the meeting to share 
with our engineers 
 
 Share information internally after contacts 
with buyer 
 
 Regularize meetings with internal meetings  
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 Meet with internal engineering to reach 
consensus before contacting buyer 
 
 Extensive internal information sharing 
between sales and engineering 
 
 All the projects are imitated and controlled by 
a salesperson 
Sales controls s-engineer's 
interaction with b-engineer 
 Norm development that all the information 
should be shared through sales 
 
 Making a policy that all the files/data are 
shared by sales 
 
 A salesperson as a final decision maker  
 Asking a buying firm to contact our firm via 
us 
 
 Request (often) buyer to contact via 
salesperson 
 
 Require buyer to initiate contacts through 
sales 
 
 Sales controls engineering commitments to 
buyer 
 
 Treat number of developments that result in 
mass production as part of engineering’s KPI 
Establish appropriate KPIs for 
s-engineer 
 Treat cost as part of engineering’s KPI  
 Treat number of successfully completed 
developments as part of engineering’s KPI 
 
 Salesperson information corrected by internal 
engineers 
Sales does cross-checking 
 Meet directly with buyer’s other functional 
units to check validity of information sales 
has received 
 
 Investigate why sensitive information is being 
requested 
 
 A salesperson as a final decision maker Salesperson needs to be a 
decision maker 
 Sales remains project leader and decision 
maker 
 
 Use of task force teams Use of task force teams 
 Preemptive network building activity Preemptive network building 
 Sales thoroughly establish social network in 
advance 
 
 Sales requires engineers to work under sales 
social network 
 
 Asking a buying firm to contact us via their 
purchasing 
Sales does not communicate 
with b-engineer 
 Avoid information exchange of sales direct 
with buyer engineers 
 
 
Regardless of whether a salesperson advocates a multichannel relationship in an inter-
organizational relationship, all of the interviewed salespersons agreed that their engineers play 
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significant roles as new boundary spanners in the multichannel relationship, and that the direct 
communication of their engineers with the buying firms generates several benefits (Table 6). First 
of all, by allowing direct communications, engineers from both companies are able to achieve better 
accuracy and completeness of information about technologies and products. The multichannel 
relationship of SI makes it possible for the engineers to share and gain tacit knowledge in an 
effective, efficient manner because they can avoid the intermediated communication of a 
salesperson who might not be an expert for the information delivered. In addition, this 
disintermediated interaction helps share information quickly between engineers, so that buying 
firms can get fast responses from their supplying firms when they are facing some emergent issues, 
such as quality issues, incomplete delivery, or unexpected changes in customer needs. Eventually, 
such effective and efficient interactions enable the buying firm to realize a fast NPD which would 
become a great competitive advantage (Chen, Damanpour, & Reilly, 2010).  
Second, salespersons also benefit from a multichannel relationship by cross checking 
ambiguous, suspicious information shared by a buying firm’s purchasing agent. When purchasing 
proposes an NPD project and suggests some investment in the facilities, such as adding an extra 
production line and buying a new system, for the possible business, a salesperson is able to check 
its feasibility and/or the business potential by contacting the other domain experts in the buying 
firm, such as an engineer, production manager, or financial manager. Third, a salesperson would 
have more business opportunities with buying firms by acquiring internal information from their 
engineers, such as future NPD plans (which allow a supplying firm to prepare for the buyer’s NPD 
in advance and, thereby, preempt the contact).  
Notably, some interviewees explained that they get some benefits by sharing price 
information about their products with their buying firm’s engineers at the engineers’ request, even 
though the buying firm’s purchasing finds such goodwill on part of the salespersons objectionable. 
Doing what the engineers want leads to building amicable relationships with the engineers and 
thereby facilitates keeping the business with the buying firm as a preferred supplier. Even when the 
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purchasing manager wants to switch over to a new supplier, the business would be secured if the 
engineers stick to the preferred supplier’s product. According to salespersons, buying firm’s 
engineers recently began to pay attention to cost innovation and, therefore, the engineers need to 
know the price information to design a cost innovative product. To this end, they tend to directly 
contact salespersons and not their purchasing managers with whom they compete for better 
evaluations from the top management team.  
For problems of a multichannel relationship (see Table 6), first of all, some salespersons 
pointed out that multiple communication channels could lead to inaccurate, incomplete information 
sharing. Whereas a salesperson can secure accurate information via cross checking when he/she 
can contact multiple communication sources in the buying firm, information from the buying firm 
becomes more inaccurate and confusing when the buying firm contacts other functional units, aside 
from sales. This is an extremely meaningful finding because the attention of the existing SCM 
literature has been limited to the single channel (only sales-purchasing relationship exists) or paired 
channels (engineering-engineering, logistics-logistics, manufacturing-manufacturing) (Carter & 
Miller, 1989; Fawcett, Ellram, & Ogden, 2006). This finding suggests that non-paired channels, 
especially those between a salesperson in a supplying firm and multiple sources in a buying firm, 
or between multiple sources in a supplying firm and purchasing in a buying firm, should be 
considered in SI research.  
Most of the salespersons agreed that what they were very worried about was their engineers’ 
thoughtless support at the buying firm’s request. They pointed out their engineers’ inability to filter 
out requests or information sharing that would not be helpful for their entire organization. During 
a meeting with the buying firm, they may readily admit some mistakes which might not be their 
fault, carelessly accept a disadvantageous type of contract for NPD, thoughtlessly expose sensitive 
information about core competency, and agree on unwritten changes with respect to product 
specification upon a buyer’s request—which affects a product yield rate that determines unit price. 
We define such behaviors of an engineer as an engineer’s inadvertent benevolence—an engineer’s 
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willingness to accommodate a buyer’s requests without proper consideration of the resultant 
impacts. One of our interviewees describes an engineer’s inadvertent benevolence as follows: 
“When buyer’s engineers directly meet our engineer to find the root cause of the defect 
of their final product, our engineer may readily admit the mistake, even though it is 
actually not our problem but their problem. In this case, the buyer’s engineer claims 
compensation for the defect, which is very huge damage to our company. If we were there, 
we could have managed the issue. Since salespersons contact many functional units in 
the buying firm, we can know where exactly the problem comes from.” 
 
2.4.2 Decentralized work process 
In a traditional relationship, a salesperson is the only boundary spanner who manages and 
controls all the information and requests from buying firms, so that the salesperson can hold the 
central position when working with the buying firm (Carter & Miller, 1989). For example, when a 
buying firm initiates a NPD project and searches for a potential partner, a salesperson of the 
partnering firm would be the first gateway that the buying firm contacts for discussion. However, 
our respondents explained that a salesperson increasingly loses his/her central position when 
working with the buying firm (Appendix 3). According to one of respondents, since the electronic 
industry requires an intensive collaboration and interaction with supplying firms, particularly with 
their engineers (Birou & Fawcett, 1994), the engineers increasingly serve as the primary contact 
points that the buying firm mainly communicates with. During the collaboration, a buyer’s engineer 
and a supplier’s engineer not only share tacit and explicit knowledge for ongoing product 
development projects but also check the feasibility of a new project, which is supposed to be done 
with sales. A buying firm’s engineer and/or purchasing manager often arrange(s) a technical 
meeting with a supplying firm’s engineer without a salesperson, and discuss about not only 
technological issues but also sales’ traditional work issues, such as a product specification, 
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substitute, potential projects, a contract type, or even prices. Some respondents complained that 
they lose room to negotiate a contract if their engineers thoughtlessly agree upon anything that is 
supposed to be carefully negotiated by sales. They explained that such an engineer’s encroachment 
on the work boundary of sales, regardless of whether or not it is on purpose, makes it more difficult 
for sales to work with the external partners (e.g., a buying firm’s purchasing). The buying firm may 
view the supplying firm’s engineer as a representative of the supplying firm. What is even worse 
is that the buying firm may think of a salesperson as not being a trustworthy partner if the 
salesperson fails to keep the promises that his/her engineer made during the technical meeting.  
Moreover, a multichannel relationship allows the engineer to obtain more information 
about the buying firm or its product/technology than the salespersons, who are supposed to be the 
recipients of this information in a traditional relationship. Such an asymmetry of information makes 
it difficult for sales to take the lead in doing a new project with the buying firm because it is hard 
to persuade the engineer to follow the salesperson’s words. Thus, some salespersons pointed out 
“greater internal conflict with engineering” as one of the problems in a multichannel relationship. 
Therefore, our findings lead to the following propositions. 
Proposition 1a: In SI, a salesperson loses his/her central position in external work process 
(i.e., working with a buying firm). 
Proposition 1b: Decentralization of external work process weakens a salesperson’s 
influence internally and with the buyer. 
 
2.4.3 Increasing work dependence 
In a traditional relationship, a salesperson does not have to worry about his/her engineers’ 
behaviors because the engineers barely have a chance to directly meet or communicate with their 
customers in the electronic industry. The only concern that a salesperson may have about the 
engineers is about their development or designing performance of the products that need to be sold 
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to the customer. While the salesperson’s performance somewhat relies on the quality of the 
products that the engineers design and develop, most of their performance would be determined by 
their sales skills. However, a multichannel relationship increases work dependence of a salesperson 
over his/her engineer because it allows the engineer to have an independent collaboration channel 
to the buying firm and the salesperson’s work performance depends highly on the information that 
the engineer has. All of the respondents said that if the engineer does not share any information 
acquired from the buying firm with the salesperson (regardless of whether or not it is on purpose), 
the salesperson is more likely to be in trouble when working (particularly when negotiating) with 
the buying firm’s purchasing. One of the salespersons we interviewed shared the following 
statement that reflects such a concern of a salesperson. 
“All the information in the engineering channel will be shared with salespersons, but we 
worry that missing information may exist, which would damage us later. The missing 
information could be product development-related issues (defect, problem, etc.) and the 
buying firm’s additional requests or work. If we work with a purchasing manager or a 
buyer’s engineer unit without knowing about these issues, we will be in trouble.” 
In a traditional relationship, the engineer designs products or initiates new projects based on the 
salesperson’s information, and the salesperson sells the product to customers. Thompson (1967) 
views such a work relationship as a “sequential interdependency” in which the outputs from one 
stage become inputs to another. In order to manage this kind of interdependence, a plan for the 
smooth flow would be an appropriate way; that is, a salesperson usually makes the entire plan to 
work with a particular customer and the engineers do their part based on this plan. In a multichannel 
relationship, however, the work relationship between a salesperson and an engineer becomes that 
of “reciprocal interdependence” (Thompson, 1967) because the engineer also independently works 
with the customer through his/her own communication channel with the buying firm, which affects 
the salesperson’s work performance. In the electronic industry, a supplying firm’s engineer 
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intensively collaborates with the buying firm through this channel. All the respondents in our study 
advocated the collaboration between their engineers and buying firms in that both the engineers 
and the buying firm can have a better understanding of products and technologies as we mentioned 
previously in Table 6. However, they stressed that salespersons must be involved in the 
communication and interaction. One reason is what we already mentioned in the previous 
paragraph and the other is that the engineers are just interested in technical achievement which may 
not be economically viable. For example, one salesperson complained that “without us, our 
engineer focuses too much on technical issues, overlooking feasibility.” (Appendix 3). He 
explained that his engineer’s behavior not only results from engineers’ silo mentality but also from 
the buying firms’ opportunism. The following statement by a salesperson explains this.  
“When sharing data with a buying firm, salespersons should investigate why buyer’s 
engineers request the information/data by contacting or meeting with many other 
functional units in the buying firm. Salespersons must figure out whether (1) the project 
could succeed and go on for mass production or (2) it is just for the buyer’s engineer’s 
personal interest (his own performance).” 
Through interviews with salespersons, we understood that salespersons encourage their engineers 
to communicate and collaborate with buying firms (especially with engineers in the buying firms) 
because such collaborations enable the supplying firm to quickly respond to the buying firms’ 
requirements and needs. However, we found that the multichannel relationship with the technical 
channel ends up increasing a salesperson’s dependence on his/her engineer in that (1) the 
salesperson worries about missing information and (2) the engineer’s silo mentality, both of which 
damage the salesperson’s performance. For a solution to mitigate risk resulting from the increasing 
dependence on the engineer, many salespersons pointed out that they should pay careful attention 
to communication and information shared between buyers and their engineers (Appendix 3). 
Therefore, our findings lead to the following propositions. 
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Proposition 2a: a salesperson’s dependence on an engineer in terms of work performance 
increases 
Proposition 2b: greater dependence on an engineer gives rise to greater attention of a 
salesperson to information monitoring between buyers and their engineers 
 
2.4.4 Increasing indirect communication 
One of the most critical problems that salespersons commonly experience when involved in 
a multichannel relationship is an inconsistency in the voice and information shared by a buying 
firm through its multiple channels. One of our respondents described such an issue as follows: 
“A multichannel relationship generates inconsistent information. For example, via their 
engineering channel, our engineers may receive information different from what I got 
from purchasing. For example, purchasing and sales decided a specific level of product 
specification during the negotiation, but later the buyer’s engineer requested a different 
level of specification to our engineers.” 
Such an issue causes a serious problem for a salesperson—who had already made a contract with 
the purchasing manager at a certain price with a specific level of product specification—if his/her 
engineer accepts the request from the buyer’s engineer. A salesperson explained that any change in 
product specification affects production yield rates because the higher specification of a project 
inevitably results in higher defect rates given the production process of the supplying firm, and 
thereby lower production yield rate. He mentioned that “we usually promise a certain level of 
product yield rate to purchasing, but if the rate is changed due to the change in product specification, 
we will be in trouble in working with purchasing. So, we need to keep monitoring communications 
in the engineering channel.”  
If a contract is already made between a salesperson and the purchasing manager for a certain 
level of product yield rate and unit price, but the salesperson’s engineer thoughtlessly 
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accommodates the requests from the buyer’s engineer, the salesperson would have two choices. 
First, he/she could try to meet the new product yield rate that would be changed by the engineer’s 
accommodation to fulfill the new product specification at all costs; for example, he/she gives up 
some profits (e.g., originally $2/unit but dropped to $1/unit for meeting the new yield rate) to keep 
the promise or puts the pressure on suppliers to share the consequences. Second, he/she could just 
ignore the request from the buyer’s engineer and keep the written contract made with the purchasing 
at the expense of the relationship with the engineer. However, salespersons cannot go for the second 
option unless they have more power over the buying firm. Therefore, they would just try to keep 
the new promise that their engineers made with buying firm’s engineers even though they might 
lose some profits by doing so. Instead, they control and monitor interactions and communication 
in the technical channel to prevent their engineers’ inadvertent benevolence. Our respondents 
argued that their engineers barely understood the organizational objectives and thereby 
thoughtlessly agreed on additional work/requests which could negatively affect the entire 
company’s performance. That is why salespersons said that they needed to control and monitor 
their engineers’ behaviors. One of our respondents made the following statement that reflects such 
a concern of a salesperson. 
“For sure, the direct communication between engineers would help them to deeply 
understand technology related issues, but we cannot understand the issues unless we are 
there (don’t know what is happening)…However, we must be involved in the conversation 
if it contains the important issues that might be a risk to our company, such as quality 
issues, defective parts, contract-related issues, or volume issues, which are highly related 
to our work area. Even in the conversation for small issues, we should be 
involved…Therefore, sales must be a coordinator, controller, and filter by monitoring all 
of the communication between engineers.” 
Proposition 3a: In SI, a salesperson experiences indirect communications through his/her engineers 
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Proposition 3b: The more indirect communication salespersons experience, the more the concern 
they have about an engineer’s inadvertent benevolence 
 
2.4.5 Salespersons’ behavioral constraints 
In addition to the benefits and problems of a multichannel relationship, our respondents were 
asked, with respect to the solutions, to mitigate the problems that they pointed out. They gave us 
possible solutions that might help a multichannel relationship work (Table 6) for example, “regular 
internal information sharing between sales and an s-engineer (i.e. supplier’s engineer),” “cross-
checking,” “use of task force team,” etc. They believed that they could cover the weaknesses of the 
disintermediated communication pattern by intensively interacting with their engineers in the form 
of information sharing and/or working as a team. By doing so, they accept their engineers as new 
boundary spanners who are allowed to directly communicate with the buying firm. However, most 
of the salespersons whom we interviewed were negative about the direct communication between 
their engineers and the buying firm without passing through them because they were concerned 
about the engineer’s inadvertent benevolence. Interestingly, most of the solutions that the 
salespersons were thinking about and/or actually implementing were to interrupt the engineer’s 
direct communication with the buying firm. The following statements from our respondents reflect 
such behaviors. 
“We try to control internal information by locking security on the sensitive information 
and by making the data/file share with or send to the buying firm through us, in order to 
prevent any problem from the information sharing” 
“We do not share any information about price with our engineers, even though they really 
want to know about it. So, our engineers do not know our product price. We don’t want 
them to share it with the buying firm by mistake.  
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“The experienced salespersons thoroughly build and manage their networks in the 
buying firm beforehand so that all the information goes to and is transferred through 
salespersons.” 
We viewed the solutions, which the salespersons suggested, as their behavioral constraints 
that limit the realization of the desired organizational goals (Kull et al., 2013) because their 
solutions limited the direct communication between their engineers and the buying firm. In other 
words, the salespersons’ behavioral constraints end up preventing a buying firm (a supplying firm) 
from directly collaborating with its supplying firm (buying firm). We label such behaviors of a 
salesperson as barricading behaviors—defined as a salesperson’s actions to block the direct access 
to information and/or persons between his/her non-traditional boundary spanners (engineers) and 
the buyers. For example, a salesperson blocks engineers’ boundary spanning activities by 
developing internal security measures to protect sensitive information so that it is not shared 
without the salesperson’s consent. Moreover, a salesperson builds a preemptive interpersonal 
network in buying firms so that all the information pass through a salesperson. We define the former 
as a salesperson’s internal barricading—controlling internal partners (a supplying firm’s engineer) 
from directly accessing external partners (a buying firm’s purchasing and/or engineer)—and the 
latter as a salesperson’s external barricading—managing external partners from directly accessing 
internal partners.  
Since we interviewed only salespersons, our interview data cannot prove whether such 
behaviors of a salesperson actually limit SI performance. However, we argue that their barricading 
behaviors reduce the direct interaction between two knowledge sources which is essential for SI 
performance (Cousins & Lawson, 2011), thereby resulting in distorted, missing, and/or incomplete 
information. Eventually, SI performance could be damaged. Further empirical study will be 
required to have a clearer understanding of this relationship.  
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Proposition 4: As a salesperson is concerned about an engineer’s inadvertent benevolence, he/she 
shows barricading behaviors. 
 
2.5 DISCUSSION 
SI becomes more important for firms to generate competitive advantages and survive in the 
market. A buying firm benefits from SI by forming a multichannel relationship with the supplying 
firm. In other words, not only a salesperson of the supplying firm but also other domain experts 
(e.g. the supplying firm’s engineer) are allowed to directly communicate with the buying firm, so 
that they can share complete information and solve unexpected problems quickly with the buying 
firm. However, the existing SI literature has not been interested in issues related to the multichannel 
relationship. Even though they assume a multichannel relationship in a buyer-supplier relationship, 
they oversimplify the relationship by simply viewing a company as a unitary actor who speaks to 
its partnering firm with one voice through a single channel (van der Vaart & van Donk, 2008). Also, 
they have overlooked the role of the salesperson in the multichannel relationship. Our study 
addresses these unexplored areas and provides some insights into the multichannel relationship 
from a salesperson’s perspective.  
First, this study investigates a salesperson’s work characteristics when involved in a 
multichannel relationship from the sociotechnical system perspective. Our study found that a 
salesperson’s technical centralities, requisites, and flows in a multichannel relationship are changed 
in relation to a traditional buyer-supplier relationship. In other words, while a salesperson possesses 
a central position when working with buying firms in a traditional relationship in which he/she can 
be the only boundary spanner of the supplying firm, he/she loses the focal position (technical 
centralities) particularly in an electronic industry in which intensive collaboration between a 
supplying firm’s engineer and its buying firm is highly required. Moreover, such a multichannel 
relationship increases work dependence of a salesperson on his/her engineer (technical requisites) 
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because lots of information that the engineer shares with the buying firm, influences the negotiation 
performance of the salesperson with the buying firm and/or the profits of the entire organization 
that the salesperson represents. Lastly, the salesperson experiences a lot of indirect communication 
via the engineering channel (engineer-buying firm) (technical flows). These changes in the 
technical system affect a salesperson’s social system and brings about the salesperson’s behavioral 
constraints (barricading behaviors). These findings are useful when buying firms design SI which 
they need to benefit from. By examining these issues about a salesperson’s work characteristics 
and appropriately managing them, buying firms will be able to receive full support from their 
suppliers’ engineers without any interruption of the salesperson.  
 Second, our study introduces new concepts in SI literature: an engineer’s inadvertent 
benevolence and a salesperson’s barricading behavior. Sincere support by a supplying firm’s 
engineer is essential for successful SI performance. Buying firms will be able to generate 
competitive advantages from SI if their supplying firms actively share important, sensitive 
information and willingly do more work beyond the contract. However, we found that the supplying 
firm’s salesperson tends to view the engineer’s cooperative behaviors as being too supportive—
inadvertent benevolence—which should be controlled or limited, resulting in the salesperson’s 
behavioral constraints toward the cooperation. In general, benevolence has been considered a 
positive driver for successful integration in inter-organizational relationships, but it might not be 
the case if the benevolence is interpreted as excessive, unnecessary support by a salesperson. Also, 
we introduce a new concept—a salesperson’s barricading behavior. Unlike the existing literature 
that focuses on behavioral constraints over the other side of the business partner (i.e., supplying 
firm over its buying firm, and vice versa), our study conceptualizes another type of behavioral 
constraint over the internal member within the same organization. This constraint may be able to 
present another root cause of the failure of SI.  
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3. CHAPTER 3 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A hyper-competitive business environment requires firms to integrate with suppliers to meet 
customer needs quickly, resulting in a multichannel communication structure between a buyer’s 
functional units and a supplier’s functional units. This structure of SI enables buyers (buying firm’s 
purchasing and engineering) to directly access a supplier’s engineers and discuss their knowledge 
without passing through its salesperson (Carter & Miller, 1989). The direct linkage makes it 
possible to initiate independent meetings at the discretion of the buyer’s engineers and/or the 
supplier’s engineers and thereby ensure space and time to closely work with each other for their 
desired goals, such as a competitive product design and innovation, and a faster product launch 
(Droge et al., 2004; Koufteros et al., 2007a; Parker, Zsidisin, & Ragatz, 2008b; Kenneth J. Petersen 
et al., 2005a). In addition, direct communication facilitates explicit and tacit knowledge about 
product developments to be shared immediately between domain experts who can discuss them 
without formality and constraint, resulting in efficient joint problem solving activities (Chen & 
Paulraj, 2004). As a result of this communication pattern, a firm can access its supplier’s core ability 
(Ellis, Henke, & Kull, 2012) and thereby enhance its performance (Fabbe-Costes & Jahre, 2008; 
Flynn et al., 2010b; Ho, Au, & Newton, 2002; Mackelprang et al., 2014; Power, 2005; van der 
Vaart & van Donk, 2008).  
However, the extant SI literature assumes that knowledge sharing from its supplying firm 
(particularly from engineers) to a buying firm would be guaranteed once the technical channel 
between the two firms is established (Cousins & Lawson, 2011; Lawson, Petersen, Cousins, & 
Handfield, 2009; Parker et al., 2008a; Kenneth J. Petersen, Handfield, & Ragatz, 2005b; Salvador 
& Villena, 2013; Song & Thieme, 2009). Given that SI operates at the expense of a salesperson 
who loses his/her position of being the sole gatekeeper (Kull et al., 2013), the direct access to a 
supplier’s engineer might not be realistic unless the traditional liaison (i.e., salesperson) accepts the 
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disintermediated communication. From a salesperson’s perspective, the multichannel 
communication structure of SI limits his/her traditional role of the sole gatekeeper (Carter & Miller, 
1989; Cho & Chang, 2008) but, on the contrary, increases an engineer’s autonomy to work with a 
buying firm (Murtha et al., 2011). For example, in a traditional buyer-supplier relationship, a 
salesperson is the only boundary spanner who controls and filters all the information to maximize 
a supplier’s benefits (Van Den Berg et al., 2014). However, such a beneficial position may be 
undermined by a multichannel relationship due to the engineer’s autonomous communication with 
the buyer without the traditional intermediator—a salesperson. During such interactions, the 
engineer may discuss not only technological issues with the buyer but also issues traditionally in 
the realm of sales, such as product specifications, substitutes, potential projects, contract types, or 
even prices. We define such behaviors as (1) an engineer’s inadvertent benevolence—an engineer’s 
willingness to accommodate a buyer’s requests without proper consideration of the resultant 
impacts. Also, interacting with the buying firm may increase the engineer’s avidity and/or silo 
mentality to pursue their own goals. He/she may distort and/or omit information acquired via their 
own communication channel with the buying firm. We define such behaviors as (2) an engineer’s 
internal opportunism—an engineer takes advantage of a boundary spanning role to pursue his/her 
own self-interest. These behaviors of an engineer may compel salespersons to control/manage the 
direct interaction between their non-traditional boundary spanners (engineers) and the buyers 
(Murtha et al., 2011). We call such behavioral constraints of salespersons as barricading behaviors, 
defined as blocking engineers from directly accessing the buying firm. Two types of an engineer’s 
behaviors may make a salesperson stay away from a central position in the inter-organizational 
collaboration, resulting in the salesperson’s uncooperative behaviors toward realization of SI to 
keep his/her powerful position (Cho & Chang, 2008; Honeycutt, Thelen, Thelen, & Hodge, 2005; 
Murtha et al., 2011). Therefore, understanding what happens to a salesperson in the course of SI is 
important. By doing so, we can find a salesperson’s behavioral constraints in SI for NPD.  
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Nevertheless, SCM literature has not examined problematic issues inside a supplier which 
result from an engineer’s autonomous interaction with buyers until Kull et al. (2013) pointed out 
that “the importance of sales/marketing managers may diminish as SI reduces the need of their 
intervention” (p. 72). Given that a buying firm develops its competitive advantages by gaining its 
supplying firm’s sincere support (Ellis et al., 2012), it is very important to understand behavioral 
constraints that might occur within the supplying firm, which might, in turn, impede successful 
collaborations with the buying firm. However, no studies have looked at these issues. Despite 
several efforts to understand barriers to integration (Fawcett et al., 2008; Gleen Richey et al., 2009, 
2010; Harland, Caldwell, Powell, & Zheng, 2007) as you can see in Table 2, they ignore the barrier 
issues that could come up from the internal processes or employees of suppliers. Accordingly, little 
attention has been paid to the role of a salesperson in SI. In marketing literature, on the contrary, 
numerous studies have examined the cognitive/behavioral constraints of salespersons in the forms 
of work alienation (Agarwal, 1993; Singh, 1998), reduced organizational commitment (Michaels, 
Cron, Dubinsky, & Joachimsthaler, 1988), and innovative resistance (Cho & Chang, 2008; 
Honeycutt et al., 2005). In addition, Murtha et al. (2011) explain that a sales manager blocks free 
interactions between the other members in his/her account management team (e.g., engineers, 
financial specialists, etc.) and his/her customers because he/she worries about the other members’ 
opportunistic behaviors toward the customers. However, despite considerable research on 
salespersons, the marketing literature provides little explanation about a salesperson’s behavioral 
constraints in SI for NPD.  
To address the limitations in the extant literature, we develop a theoretical model that 
investigates the effect of an engineer’s involvement in a buyer’s NPD process on supplier 
performance, mediated by an engineer’s behaviors (i.e., an engineer’s inadvertent benevolence and 
opportunistic behaviors) and a salesperson’s behavioral constraints (i.e., barricading behaviors). 
Drawing on STS theory (Pasmore, Francis, Haldeman, & Shani, 1982), we theorize that an 
engineer’s increasing autonomy in collaboration with buyers—which is designed for a greater 
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organizational effectiveness—limits a salesperson’s autonomy for his/her work, paradoxically 
hindering organizational effectiveness. Using survey data and archival data, we answer the 
following questions: (1) what behaviors of an engineer would result from SI for NPD, and (2) how 
would the engineer’s behaviors affect a salesperson’s behavioral constraint which in turn affects a 
supplier’s performance?  
By answering these questions, we contribute to both SI literature and the STS theory. First, 
we contribute to SI literature by investigating the impact of a salesperson’s behavioral constraints 
on SI failure. Even though successful SI relies heavily on a supplier’s cooperation, the extant 
literature has overlooked how SI derives full cooperation from the supplier. How a salesperson in 
the supplier, who used to be the sole gatekeeper of the supplier, plays a role for the cooperation has 
especially not drawn any attention in SCM literature. Given that SI changes suppliers’ traditional 
working practices for inter-organizational collaboration (Carter & Miller, 1989; Kull et al., 2013), 
investigating what happens to a salesperson under an SI situation could be important to understand 
SI failure. By examining a salesperson’s behavioral constraints under this new work pattern, we 
can have a better understanding of how SI affects supplier performance.  
Second, we contribute to the STS theory by explaining that a group’s autonomy does not 
always guarantee an organizational effectiveness in SI if the autonomy limits another group’s 
autonomy in the same organization. While STS theory articulates that an autonomous collaboration 
of engineers with buyers could facilitate greater SI performance, we argue that it would not be the 
case if the engineers’ collaboration operated at the expense of salespersons’ discretion as boundary 
spanners. By empirically investigating how a salesperson’s behavioral constraint results from an 
engineer’s misbehaviors under the situation in which the engineer is involved in the buyer’s NPD, 
we present that organizing an autonomous working group without proper consideration for the 
other’s autonomy would not always guarantee a desired organizational effectiveness, which is what 
the STS theory overlooks.  
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3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
3.2.1 Behavioral Constraints in Supplier Integration (SI) 
Numerous scholars have investigated why SI fails. As you can see in Table 2, one of the 
reasons is a lack of connectivity that affects visibility between a buyer and supplier, such as a poor 
information system (Mober et al., 2003), lack of communication (Elligner et al., 2006), and 
incompatible processes/systems (Fawcett et al., 2008). The other is social issues, such as lack of 
trust (Mober et al., 2003), functional silo (Barrat, 2004), and a misaligned goal (Fawcett et al., 
2012). When firms fail to solve these social problems that have occurred in the course of SI, the 
integration process could generate resistance between parties involved in the process (Fawcett et 
al., 2012), and the intransigence eventually becomes behavioral constraints to SI (Kull et al., 2013).  
Many studies have introduced the types of behavioral constraints in inter-organizational 
collaborations; for example, sabotage and withdrawal (Kirkman & Shapiro, 1997), ignoring 
requests (Clegg, 2000), and discontinuance of information/knowledge sharing (Pan & Scarbrough, 
1999). Also, shirking responsibilities, hiding or providing wrong information, hollow promises, 
and window dressing efforts are potential behavioral constraints that could occur in SI (Yan & Kull, 
2015). They could happen either/both on the supplier side or/and the buyer side, and SI fails when 
the constraints are generated in the course of the integration process (Fawcett et al., 2012). Kull et 
al. (2013) specifically describe behavioral constraints of traditional boundary spanners—a 
purchasing manager and salesperson—in an SI situation. When engineers from both firms (buyer 
and supplier) directly work with each other, the the two traditional liaisons (purchasing manager 
and salesperson) are less involved in decision-making. Therefore their social positions as 
gatekeepers are threatened. Such a threat could trigger their uncooperative behaviors toward SI. 
Our study focuses on a salesperson’s behavioral constraints.  
SI is to allow a supplier’s engineer to directly communicate with its buyer’s engineer and 
purchasing manager without a salesperson, who used to serve as a gatekeeper (Fawcett et al., 2006). 
Given that successful SI cannot be guaranteed without the salespersons’ support, understanding 
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their behaviors in SI is an important topic that should not be underestimated in SI research. While 
numerous SCM studies have extensively investigated behavioral constraint issues in SI, most of 
them focus on the partners’ behavioral constraints that result from transaction contexts, such as 
power/dependence (Joshi & Arnold, 1997), relational norms (Joshi & Stump, 1999), formalization 
(Provan & Skinner, 1989), or uncertainty (Schilling & Steensma, 2002). Although Yan & Kull 
(2015) introduce supplier’s behavioral constraints that arise from task contexts, including product 
complexity and technological novelty, it is still unclear why SI could cause a salesperson’s 
behavioral constraints and how it could impede a supplier’s cooperation for successful SI. 
Whereas a salesperson’s behavioral constraints have been out of interest in the SCM field, 
marketing literature has investigated salespersons’ behavioral constraints for a long time (Table 7) 
in the form of work alienation (Agarwal, 1993; Michaels et al., 1988), reducing organizational 
commitment (Agarwal, 1993; Michaels et al., 1988; Singh, 1998), turnover and burnout (Honeycutt 
et al., 2005), resistance to adopt sale force automation (SFA) tools (Cho & Chang, 2008), and 
internal blocking (Murtha et al., 2011). Especially, Murtha et al., (2011) introduce “internal 
blocking” to explain an account manager’s behavioral constraints when all the account team 
members can access a customer. They argue that an account manger’s concern about other team 
members’ opportunities incites an account manager’s behavioral constraint that blocks the other 
members from accessing information and/or persons in the buyer. Our research extends research 
on behavioral constraints to SI by applying the internal blocking of a salesperson to the SI context.   
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Table 7 Behavioral Constraints of Salespersons 
Study Behavioral Constraints 
(Michaels et al., 1988) 1. Reducing organizational commitment 
2. Work alienation 
(Agarwal, 1993) 1. Reducing organizational commitment 
2. Work alienation 
(Singh, 1998) 1. Low participation 
2. Job tension 
3. Reducing organizational commitment 
4. Turnover intention 
(Honeycutt et al., 2005) 1. Salesperson burnout 
2. Voluntary salesperson turnover 
3. Resistance to adoption and /or underutilization of SFA tools 
(Cho & Chang, 2008) 1. Innovation resistance 
(Murtha et al., 2011) 1. Internal blocking 
 
 
3.2.2 Sociotechnical System Theory 
Sociotechnical System (STS) theory views a firm as a system comprised of two subsystems: 
(1) the social system that is comprised of people who work in the organization and all that is human 
about their presence” (Pasmore, 1988, p. 25), such as “attitudes, beliefs, relations, cultures, norms, 
politics, behaviors, and emotions” (Kull et al., 2013, p. 66) and (2) the technical system that 
“consists of the tools, techniques, artifacts, methods, configurations, procedures, and knowledge 
used by the organizational employees to acquire inputs, transform inputs into outputs, and provide 
output or services to clients or customers” (Pasmore, 1988, p. 55). In other words, a firm is made 
up of people who adopt and use tools, techniques, processes, procedures, and knowledge to produce 
products or services required by customers. Thus, organizational effectiveness and success are 
determined by how well the social and the technical systems are in harmony, not merely by the 
technological features or capabilities (Emery, 1959).  
The core assumption of STS theory is joint optimization—a harmony between the social 
system and the technical system. When a technical system that is newly introduced is not integrated 
into the existing social system, the organization experiences unexpected social resistances and, in 
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turn, organizational ineffectiveness (Fox, 1995; Kull et al., 2013; Majchrzak & Borys, 2001; 
Pasmore et al., 1982). Since the social system operates and exists in the form of social agreements 
among individuals (Barnard, 1938), the new technical system, that is introduced to an organization 
without social consensus, is likely to break the existing social agreements, and thereby results in 
some resistances toward the technical system (Petersen & Handfield, 2008). The new technology 
that is applied to an organization may hinder the work process that individual workers used to 
follow, making the execution of their work more difficult (Trist & Bamforth, 1951). Therefore, a 
fundamental objective of STS theory is that an organization should be designed to provide QWL 
(i.e., an organization needs to be designed to meet human needs) through joint optimization 
(Griffith & Dougherty, 2001). By doing so, the organization can get the desired organizational 
effectiveness from the technical system that the organization adopts (Cherns, 1987).  
 
3.2.3 Autonomous working group and its boundary  
STS theory insists that QWL can be achieved when people who adopt and use a work are 
allowed to design the work themselves (Molleman & Broekhuis, 2001a). By providing 
employees—who directly interface with new work and/or a new work pattern—with as much 
autonomy as possible to organize and structure their activities and also use their own knowledge 
and experiences freely, joint optimization can be achieved because the employees can adapt 
themselves to the new task/work pattern or vice versa with fewer constraints (Cherns, 1987). In 
other words, once what must be done for the work has been established, how it should be done 
needs to be left in the hands of those who will execute the work (Hyer et al., 1999). They may find 
their own way to accomplish the desired aims of the work or may find the effective manner to 
smoothly utilize the given measure (technical system) so as to minimize their social resistance that 
results from the new system adoption. Thus, many STS scholars suggest an autonomous work 
group as a key solution toward this end (Hackman & Oldham, 1976; Molleman & Molleman, 2006). 
Organizing an autonomous work group would help its members control variances/errors as seen 
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possible and freely define its goal, a work boundary, and the way the operation of the work is 
performed (Niepcel & Molleman, 1998). This self-managing team mitigates the members’ social 
resistance to the work including newly adopted techniques, processes, or practices (Kull et al., 2013) 
and enhances their creativity (Liu et al., 2011). Moreover, when an organization is designed to (1) 
control variances/errors as near to their point of origin as possible (i.e., the principle of 
sociotechnical criterion) and (2) empower local workers to decide how to perform tasks (i.e., the 
principle of minimal critical specification) (Molleman & Broekhuis, 2001b), the organization 
accomplishes the desired organizational effectiveness (e.g., price, quality, flexibility, and 
innovation). In conclusion, STS theory argues that an autonomous work group facilitates an 
alignment between the organization’s social system and the new technical system and thereby 
accomplishes greater organizational effectiveness.  
Organizing an autonomous working group determines its work boundary (Pasmore, 1988). 
Due to this boundary, information sharing and cooperation between autonomous working groups 
decreases as compared to within the group (Szulanski, 2000). A boundary established between 
highly interdependent groups impedes the sharing of information, knowledge, and learning (Cherns, 
1987) because each group tends to develop a different, incompatible “thought world” (Dougherty, 
1992) with which members within each group pursue their own interests, without taking into 
account the other group’s situation. Thus, while the group may perform well, the other group who 
is intertwined with this group in terms of a work process is likely to be under behavioral restrictions 
and suffer from low performance (Kull et al., 2013). An inappropriate boundary location between 
the highly independent groups undesirably shifts the type of their work interdependence from 
“reciprocal” to “sequential” (Thompson, 1976), which makes one group subordinated to the other 
in terms of the decision-making process. This new work pattern leads to the limited latitude of the 
subordinate group in executing its own work or adapting to external changes (Pasmore, 1988). 
Therefore, coordination and cooperation between the groups are increasingly required (Grant, 
1996). If the precedent group keeps pursuing its own interests without proper consideration of the 
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resultant impacts, the follower group experiences chaos (Crook & Combs, 2007). From the STS’s 
standpoint, the silo mentality of the precedent group ends up limiting the following group’s latitude 
in doing their work and adopting and/or adapting to any environmental change. When the 
dependent group’s members lose autonomy in their work, they experience poor QWL (Venkatesh 
et al., 2010). As a result, the members of this group show social resistance (Pasmore 1988). In 
addition, if the precedent group enjoys excessive latitude in pursuing their own interests, the 
improvement of the entire organizational system is limited (Fawcett et al., 2012; Hyer et al., 1999). 
 
3.2.4 Multichannel Channel Relationship in Supplier Integration 
We define SI as a process that forms a multichannel relationship between a buyer and 
supplier by allowing each domain expert of a buying firm (e.g., purchasing, engineering, 
manufacturing, etc.) to coordinate, cooperate, and collaborate directly with the counterparts of a 
supplying firm (i.e., sales, engineering, manufacturing, etc.) so that the buyer can utilize the 
supplier’s core resources effectively and efficiently. Many scholars have provided SI definitions 
that might imply the multichannel relationship aspect of SI (Table 1) but no one has actually pointed 
out this aspect in their definitions. Instead, they describe SI as an inter-organizational state and/or 
a process in which a supplier is structurally embedded into its buyer. Such firm-level SI definitions 
have resulted in the extant SCM literature that tends to ignore the existence of the plural channels 
and oversimplify them by simply viewing a company as a unitary actor who speaks to its partnering 
firm with one voice through a single channel (van der Vaart & van Donk, 2008). The 
oversimplification has ended up with the lack of understanding of existing SCM literature on 
multiple linkages across firms. In addition, the existing definitions largely focus on process 
connectivity issues, overlooking non-process issues such as changes in the work routine of 
individuals or the functional units involved in the integration practice (Barki & Pinsonneault, 2005; 
Barratt, 2004; Fawcett et al., 2008; Gleen Richey et al., 2009, 2010; Moberg et al., 2003). Thus, 
little explanation has been provided about how SI affects a traditional boundary spanner’s work 
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and how he/she would react to the new work routine in SI. By investigating these questions, we 
can provide a new perspective to look at SI failure.  
In a traditional buyer-supplier relationship in which salespersons serve as the sole boundary 
spanners working with a buyer, the salespersons process most or all information coming from the 
buyer and distribute it to the relevant departments within their firm (Van Den Berg et al., 2014). 
They collect external knowledge about market trends, customer preference, and competitors by 
interacting with many buyers in the market (Judson et al., 2006). Then, they share the acquired 
knowledge with their fellow salespersons and employees in the other departments so that the other 
members can make the right decision for the entire company (Ernst et al., 2010). Since an 
interaction between other departments and the buyer in the traditional relationship is limited (Carter 
& Miller, 1989), the entire company relies on these gatekeepers—salespersons. In addition, they 
receive more autonomy compared to employees in the other departments because of the nature of 
their job that entails meeting customers, assessing the feasibility of new business, and negotiating 
prices (Honeycutt et al., 2005). The salespersons’ latitude enables their counterparts in a buying 
firm to perceive them as trustworthy counterparts who are competent in their work and can deliver 
as promised (Perrone, Zaheer, & Mcevily, 2003). By keeping promises they made with a buyer, 
salespersons can earn trust not only for themselves but also for the entire organization that they 
represent (Zhang, Viswanathan, & Henke, 2011b). 
On the contrary, in a multichannel relationship, an engineer as well as a salesperson play a 
boundary spanning role in NPD collaboration (Dowlatshahi, 2000). A structurally embedded 
relationship of SI ensures intensive communication (Carter & Miller, 1989) and autonomous 
collaboration between engineers from a buyer and a supplier (Kull et al., 2013). Such interactions 
enable engineers to cultivate their abilities for innovative product development by sharing each 
other’s skills and knowledge. (Hartley, Zirger, & Kamath, 1997; Petersen, 2003). Specifically, this 
disintermediated communication without a salesperson facilitates smoother knowledge sharing 
between domain experts (Ragatz, Handfield, & Scannell, 1997) and also permits immediate 
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problem solving when unexpected technical issues occur (Murtha et al., 2011). More importantly, 
it can ensure more accurate knowledge by avoiding missing or distorted information that might 
occur when a salesperson is the sole liaison for conveying knowledge (Carter & Miller, 1989). As 
a result, the effective collaboration between the domain experts positively influences the cost, 
quality, and development time of new products, resulting in a competitive advantage to survive in 
the fast changing business environment (Chen, Damanpour, & Reilly, 2010).  
 
3.2.5 An Engineer’s Inadvertent Benevolence and Internal Opportunism 
3.2.5.1 A new boundary spanner in supplier integration—an engineer 
In a multichannel relationship, a new inter-organizational communication pattern naturally 
changes the traditional working practices of a salesperson. From a buyer’s perspective, a 
multichannel relationship facilitates an immediate contact with an employee of the supplier who is 
in charge (Das et al., 2006; Petersen et al., 2003). In other words, when a buyer faces any issues 
related to products and technologies of its supplier, the buyer can directly contact the supplier’s 
engineers and solve the issues. This interaction creates time and space in which the supplier’s 
engineer can serve as a boundary spanner who can freely discuss anything about product 
developments without any restriction (Murtha et al., 2011). Furthermore, such a communication 
pattern tends to make the buyer consider the supplier’s engineer as a primary collaborator whom 
the buyer can contact for any issue (Perrone et al., 2003), and thereby the buyer relies more on the 
engineer. Frequent interaction with the buyer and the resultant dependence of the buyer on the 
supplier’s engineer can provide the engineer with a new social role as a boundary spanner and make 
the engineer play the role actively (Kull et al., 2013). 
However, it may damage the traditional work routine of an existing gatekeeper—a 
salesperson—by reducing dominance and importance of the salesperson’s tasks in the inter-
organizational collaboration (Cho & Chang, 2008; Honeycutt et al., 2005). Wagner (2003) argues 
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that SI reduces the importance of a salesperson in a highly integrated buyer-supplier relationship 
because the salesperson’s role is limited to linking a buying firm’s planning department with a 
supplying firm’s engineering/manufacturing department. Traditionally, a buyer used to contact its 
supplier’s salespersons to acquire a sample product, the product price information, or any other 
information regarding the performance and features of their products and a product’s compatibility. 
In this case, although salespersons were trained to answer the buyer’s questions, they often got the 
answers from their engineers and transferred them to the buyer if the questions contain an important 
technical issue (Carter & Miller, 1989). In a multichannel relationship, on the other hand, a buyer 
can directly contact a supplier’s engineers to get the desired information without bypassing the 
traditional gatekeeper. The more the inter-firm relationship demands a supplier’s expertise and 
skills about the products and technologies, the more likely the buyer is to consider the supplier’s 
engineers as a representative of the supplier, who can ensure the integrity of information and its 
completeness (Birou & Fawcett, 1994). Given that the aim of SI for NPD is to leverage suppliers’ 
technological capabilities and expertise to improve a buyer’s product development effectiveness 
and efficiency (Salvador & Villena, 2013), it is reasonable for the buyer to consider the supplier’s 
engineer as a primary collaborator.  
 
3.2.5.2 Internal Opportunism 
An engineer’s autonomy in collaboration with the buyer may result in an engineer’s internal 
opportunism. Murtha et al. (2011) argue that a traditional boundary (account manager) tends to be 
concerned about internal opportunism when non-traditional boundary spanners (other account team 
members) are able to contact customers directly because the non-traditional boundary spanners 
may “act with guile in their own self-interest” (p. 1582). Based on their definition which we have 
adapted for our research context, we define an engineer’s internal opportunism as the extent to 
which an engineer takes advantage of a boundary spanning role to pursue his/her own self-interest.  
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In SI for a buying firm’s NPD, engineers in its supplier are directly involved in a 
conversation with the buying firm as representatives of the supplier (Birou & Fawcett, 1994). 
Unlike a traditional relationship in which engineers are highly dependent on salespersons due to 
the asymmetry of information about customers (Cho & Chang, 2008), a multichannel relationship 
gets rid of the information asymmetries between the two parties. In other words, engineers have to 
some degree, more information via their own communication channel with the buying firm. 
Normally, a dependent party has an incentive to behave in a trustworthy manner toward a less 
dependent one (Perrone et al., 2003). However, since engineers become less dependent regarding 
customer information in a multichannel relationship, they have relatively less incentive to behave 
in a trustworthy manner toward their salespersons and are rather likely to show opportunistic 
behaviors so as to pursue their own interests (Kull et al., 2013).  
Eccles & White (1988) point out opportunistic behaviors of one business unit when it works 
with other business units. As an example, Gibbons (1998) introduces one business unit’s 
opportunism through the H. J. Heinz Company case. He explains that logistics managers of the 
company often manipulate the timing of shipment to their customer for obtaining their bonuses 
with disregard to the promise of on-time delivery that purchasing made to the customer. In addition, 
Milgrom & Roberts (1988) explain that if employees generate or manage information that a 
decision maker requires, they might have an incentive to manipulate or control the information. 
The authors explain such opportunistic behaviors as follows:  
“Such manipulation can take many forms, ranging from conscious lies concerning facts, 
through suppression of unfavorable information, to simply presenting the information in 
a way that accentuates the points supporting the interested party's preferred decision and 
then insisting on these points at every opportunity” (p. 156). 
There are two reasons why engineers might pay more attention to their own interests and why 
their behaviors could be risky to salespersons. First, a new business practice—cost innovation—
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encourages engineers to consider cost reduction from the beginning when considering joint NPD 
with a buyer (Craighead et al., 2009). The collective predisposition about cost innovation between 
engineers from two parties encourages them to share price information (Kull et al., 2013). However, 
price exposure to a buyer (inadvertent benevolence) may result in a huge disadvantage when a 
salesperson negotiates the price with a buyer’s purchasing. Second, an engineer’s KPI (Key 
Performance Index) could lead an engineer to stick to silo mentality and commit opportunistic 
behaviors. In the electronic industry, firms adopt “the number of successes in product development” 
as one of the KPIs to evaluate an engineer’s performance. This criterion stirs engineers into 
aggressive actions (engineers’ opportunism) to increase the KPI and thus get a better performance 
evaluation from the top management team. Such a behavior of the engineer occurs more often when 
the buyer prefers the engineer as a communication partner (Birou & Fawcett, 1994). Therefore, we 
hypothesize as follows: 
H1: The greater an engineer is involved in a buyer’s NPD process, the more the engineer 
shows internal opportunism 
 
3.2.5.3 Inadvertent Benevolence 
While an engineer’s direct communication with a buyer can enhance the innovativeness of 
a product delivered to its buyer (Cousins & Lawson, 2011; Salvador & Villena, 2013; Yeniyurt, 
Henke, Yalcinkaya, Henke Jr., & Yalcinkaya, 2014), such a disintermediated communication is 
likely to give rise to an engineer’s behaviors undertaking unnecessary, additional responsibilities 
upon the buyer’s request. For example, during a meeting for NPD with the buyer, the engineer may 
initiate a new project at the buyer’s request without considering the impacts on the entire company; 
carelessly accept a disadvantageous contract type for NPD; thoughtlessly expose sensitive 
information about core competency; agree on unwritten change with respect to product 
specification upon a buyer’s request—which affects a product yield rate that determines unit price. 
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We define such behaviors as an engineer’s inadvertent benevolence—an engineer’s willingness to 
accommodate a buyer’s requests without proper consideration of the resultant impacts.   
Generally, “benevolence” has been considered a key factor that generates a long-term 
orientation of buyer-supplier relationships (Johnston, McCutcheon, Stuart, & Kerwood, 2004; 
Tangpong, Hung, & Ro, 2010). In other words, a supplier’s benevolence implies that a supplier 
sincerely cares about its buyer (Ganesan, 1994) and willingly provides its core competency to the 
buyer (Schiele, Calvi, & Gibbert, 2012), which actually helps the buyer’s performance (Ellis et al., 
2012). From the salespersons’ perspective, however, their engineers’ benevolence could be risky 
because the immoderate support and honesty shown by the engineers for the buyer could result in 
a low return of their organization from the collaboration (Villena, Revilla, & Choi, 2011), and more 
importantly because thoughtless promises to the buyer could end up in the loss potential business 
opportunities with other buyers who actually offer better margins (Anderson & Jap, 2005).  
In SI for a buying firm’s NPD, a buying firm involves its supplier’ engineers in the early 
stage of the NPD process and interacts intensively with the engineers to utilize their expertise and 
knowledge for designing innovative products (Cousins & Lawson, 2011). Through this 
spatiotemporal proximity, the buying firm can develop reciprocity norms in which the engineers 
feel obligated to support the buying firm (Hald, 2012). However, the heightened reciprocity norms 
might result in unnecessary cooperation by using more resources and constraining choices beyond 
what would be optimal (Bendoly & Swink, 2007; Gargiulo & Benassi, 1999; Malhotra, 2004; Uzzi, 
1997). Further, excessive reciprocity norms might push the engineers to commit to the buying 
firm’s requests which might be too overwelming to accept (Villena et al., 2011). This is the negative 
side of SI. Anderson & Jap (2005) similarly point out that “the trust, social relationships, and 
investments that were developed to make the relationship successful became the doorway to the 
dark side” (p. 77).  
Normally, engineers tend to have a lack of understanding about the entire NPD process and 
the consequences of their activities/decisions on the entire process (Kull et al., 2013). For instance, 
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they often do not understand that even small changes in product specification could affect the entire 
benefits of the company because product specification determines product yield rate—which 
affects the cost of units. Thus, a naïve agreement (inadvertent benevolence) for a slight change in 
product specification could damage a supplier’s revenue, which is even worse when a salesperson 
has already made a written contract for the selling price with a buyer’s purchasing. Unfortunately, 
engineers often overlook the resultant impact of their behaviors on the entire organization while 
communicating and cooperating with their buying firm. Given that SI is initiated by a buying firm 
that seeks out the supplier’s unstinted support, the buying firm might exploit the engineer’s short-
sighted insight for their own interests (Carter & Miller, 1989). Therefore, we hypothesize as follows: 
H2: The greater an engineer is involved in a buyer’s NPD process, the more an engineer 
shows inadvertent benevolence 
 
3.2.6 Behavioral Constraints of a Salesperson: Barricading Behaviors 
An engineers’ misbehaviors could cause a salesperson’s behavioral constraints. We call the 
constraints a salesperson’s barricading behaviors—a salesperson’s actions to block the direct 
access of his/her non-traditional boundary spanners (engineers) to information and/or persons of 
his/her buyers. For example, a salesperson may block engineers’ boundary spanning activities by 
developing internal security measures to protect sensitive information so that it is not shared 
without the salesperson’s consent, or he/she may monitor or control the engineers’ conversations 
with the buying firm.   
Basically, suppliers have an interest in being entrusted by their customers to sell a higher 
volume of their products and in being a preferred supplier who can have a long-term business 
relationship with the buyers (Hald, Cordón, & Vollmann, 2009). To this end, salespersons of the 
suppliers try to leave good impressions on their buyers so as to build an amicable relationship with 
them (Honeycutt et al., 2005). With the high degree of discretion in decision-making, salespersons 
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try to keep promises that they made to buyers and provide as much support beyond the contract as 
possible. By doing so, the salespersons can provide their buyers with a general impression that they 
are trustworthy business partners (Perrone et al., 2003), which, in turn, results in the buyer’s trust 
in the entire organizations that the salespersons represent (Zhang, Viswanathan, & Henke, 2011a). 
However, if engineers exceed their authority by showing inadvertent benevolence (e.g., promising 
unnecessary work, accepting disadvantageous contract terms without consulting with sales), the 
salespersons might have difficulties in fulfilling some of the promises that the engineers 
thoughtlessly made (Carter & Miller, 1989). Given the difficulty in maintenance of their status of 
being trustworthy unless they keep the promises, they might not have any choice but to accept 
unreasonable requests, which could damage their own performance. For instance, if sensitive 
information (e.g., price) is exposed to a buyer by engineers, their salesperson may lose lots of 
reasons for keeping the original selling price (Singh, 1998). Eventually, the failure of negotiation 
affects future revenues of the entire company and their future sales commissions and salary rise 
negatively (Ghosh & John, 1999; Jap, 1999).  
In the same way, the engineers’ internal opportunism also generates difficulties for the 
salespersons in working with their buyers because the engineers’ opportunistic behaviors such as 
information distortion and concealment could impede effective collaboration with the buyers 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Hansen, 2002). Furthermore, a favorable customer relationship built up 
by salespersons over a long time could be damaged when the engineers thoughtlessly act in their 
favor (Murtha et al., 2011); for example, engineers take undue credit for business that the sales unit 
develops with the buyers, or they make the sales unit a scapegoat for the problems with the buyers 
(Murtha et al., 2011). Milgrom & Roberts (1988, p. 156) provide some rationales that an engineer’s 
opportunistic behaviors could be costly for the entire organization. They note as follows:  
“First, to the extent it is successful in biasing the decision maker's information, it may 
lead to decisions being taken that are inefficient from the organization's point of view. 
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Second, the time and effort spent on influence activities (and in dealing with them) are 
resources with valuable alternative uses. Yet, to the extent that influence activities are 
aimed at shifting the distribution of the net benefits of decisions among the members of 
the organization, these activities need to bring no efficiency gain to the organization that 
offsets the costs involved. Of course, if the influence activities actually lower the quality 
of decisions, their net effect is even more negative.” 
From the viewpoint of a salesperson, who represents the entire company, the engineers’ 
internal opportunism lowers the quality of decision that the firm’s representative makes and 
negatively affects the entire organization’s performance. A key solution to this problem could be 
to prevent the non-traditional boundary spanners from producing biased information so that the 
main decision maker can make a sound decision (Milgrom & Roberts, 1988). Management 
literature defines this solution as “gatekeeping” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) and marketing literature 
explains it as “blocking behavior” (Murtha et al., 2011).  
Unlike a traditional relationship in which salespersons can control all the information and 
communications coming from their buyers, a multichannel relationship makes the traditional 
boundary spanners more dependent on the new boundary spanners—engineers who directly 
communicate with the buyers for their work. It means that the salespersons need the engineers’ 
cooperation to work with the buyers without any miscommunication. If the engineers’ inadvertent 
benevolence and internal opportunism occur, the salespersons’ work pattern is limited to solving 
some problems that have occurred due to the engineers’ behavior. This also limits the salespersons’ 
discretion as boundary spanners who do business with customers. STS theory argues that 
salespersons resist when enough autonomy for their work is not ensured. Therefore, we hypothesize 
as follows: 
H3: The more the occurrence of engineer’s inadvertent benevolence, the greater the 
exhibition of barricading behaviors by the salesperson 
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H4: The more the occurrence of engineer’s internal opportunism, the greater the 
exhibition of barricading behaviors by the salesperson. 
 
3.2.7 Supplier Performance 
What effect does a salesperson’s barricading behavior have on supplier performance? Some 
may argue that the barricading behaviors may facilitate effective buyer-supplier collaboration and 
improve supplier performance because some misbehaviors by the non-traditional boundary 
spanners can be prevented (Milgrom & Roberts, 1988; Murtha et al., 2011) and because a clear 
message can be delivered to the buying firm (Carter & Miller, 1989; Van Den Berg et al., 2014). 
At the same time, several arguments can be made that the barricading behaviors act as behavioral 
constraints to SI by adversely affecting supplier performance.  
First, barricading behaviors by a salesperson result in the lack of tacit knowledge sharing 
between a buyer and a supplier. Intermediate communication increases the length of the knowledge 
sharing chain, and there is a likelihood of some degree of imperfect transmission (i.e., information 
distortion and omission) of the messages and information that the engineer wants to share with the 
buyer (Hansen, 2002). Especially, under conditions of rapid and uncertain technical changes, such 
as in the electronic industry, knowledge transfer becomes more challenging because the salesperson 
has a lack of absorptive capacity to understand the complicated, complex knowledge and carry 
them to the engineer (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Deficiency of knowledge sharing in inter-
organizational collaboration could result in the poor quality of the product in NPD (Cousins & 
Lawson, 2011).  
Second, barricading behaviors may negatively affect a supplier’s flexibility in terms of 
delivery. Carter & Miller (1989) argue that a centralized gatekeeping in inter-organizational 
collaborations makes it difficult for firms to promptly cope with unexpected events such as 
unexpected errors/defects, changes in customer needs, and regulation changes. Also, if a supplier 
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fails to solve problems as quickly as possible due to difficulties in sharing the appropriate 
knowledge from its buyer in a timely manner, the entire production process of the supplier is 
delayed, increasing the delivery time (Basole & Bellamy, 2014b).  
Third, barricading behaviors may also affect cost saving. Many supply chain scholars prove 
that effective and efficient communication between supply chain partners could save costs by 
reducing the costs to protect against opportunistic behaviors by the partner, and by fulfilling better 
product design (Carr & Pearson, 1999; Turnbull et al., 1992). When salespersons block the direct 
collaboration between their engineers and the buyer, they lose the cost benefits that are supposed 
to be obtained through SI.  
Thus, taken together, even though barricading behaviors may have a potential to affect 
supplier performance in positive manners, they create a lot of negative consequences that 
undermine supplier performance. In other words, barricading behaviors limit an essential benefit 
of SI—a multichannel relationship. Therefore, we hypothesize as follows and we present our 
research model in Figure 3: 
H5: The greater a salesperson focuses on barricading behaviors, the worse the supplier 
performance for the buyer becomes 
 
Figure 3 Research Model 
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3.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.3.1 Data Collection 
In collaboration with one electronic manufacturing firm in South Korea, we were able to 
identify 150 sales representatives of suppliers who work with this company, who are appropriate 
for our research purposes, and who also have the willingness to participate in our research. Our 
research focuses on (1) a multichannel relationship in which not only salespersons but also their 
engineers have their own communication channels with the manufacturer and (2) salespersons’ 
reactions when their engineers work directly with the manufacturer. Therefore, our respondents 
must be knowledgeable with respect to not only the commercial channel (a supplier’s salesperson-
the manufacturing firm) but also the technical channel (a supplier’s engineer-the manufacturing 
firm), and they should be facing the two channels in their daily work. Since this manufacturing firm 
started encouraging intensive interaction in the technical channel with its suppliers three years ago, 
most of the salespersons in its supplying firms have experienced both types of buyer-supplier 
relationship (single channel relationship and multichannel relationship).  
Unlike a commercial channel that every firm has, a technical channel is more likely to exist 
as a firm makes complex and complicated products (McCutcheon et al., 1997). Dealing with such 
a type of product, firms need to focus on core technology and outsource non-core parts of their 
products, closely communicating with their suppliers with respect to product design and its plan in 
order to make a good quality product (Mikkola, 2003). Also, a technical channel tends to be formed 
when firms are in a fast clock speed industry (Fine, 2000). Since firms in that industry are in time-
based competition with competitors to gain a first-mover advantage (Lieberman & Montgomery, 
1988), they should have a shortcut for efficient communication and cooperation without bypassing 
any other middlemen. These two conditions for an existence of the technical channel (technological 
complexity and a fast NPD clock speed) led us to find our samples from the electronic industry. 
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Similarly, Basole & Bellamy (2014) also describe attributes of the electronics industry being a high 
rate of technological change, high frequency of new product introductions, and the representation 
of shorter lead times.  
Using the Qualtrics software, an online survey tool, we sent out an initial email that describes 
the purpose of the research, its importance, and respondent confidentiality, requesting open and 
honest participation in answering the survey. Since the original measures were developed in 
English, we translated it to Korean. In order to ensure conceptual equivalence, three academic 
researchers used back-translation processes (Cai, Jun, & Yang, 2010). This email includes a link to 
a web-based survey questionnaire that the salespersons could answer at their convenience. After 
one month, when the initial emails were sent, the reminder emails were sent so as to increase the 
rate of response. Using this approach, we received 102 usable responses, which constitute a 
response rate of 68% (102/150). In addition to this subjective data from salespersons, we also 
obtained objective performance scores of each salesperson from the manufacturing company. This 
data consists of four sub-measures, Q (quality), D (delivery), C (cost), and R (responsiveness for 
innovation). These scores for each salesperson were measured annually by each purchasing 
manager who worked with that salesperson. The specific measures are presented in Appendix 4. 
The score for each salesperson is measured on a 100 point scale (i.e., 25 points for cost, 25 points 
for delivery, 25 points for quality and 25 points for responsiveness). By securing a sound dataset 
matching the objective performance data with the subjective survey data, we can draw reliable 
conclusions.  
Our unit of analysis is a sales-buying firm relationship for a particular purchasing item 
because each purchasing item shows a different relationship (Ellis et al., 2012). Each item is sold 
by a distinct salesperson, and there is a counterpart engineer in the same organization who also 
communicates with the manufacturing company for that item. Therefore, we instructed our 
respondents (salespersons) to answer the survey questions with respect to the items they were 
selling to the manufacturer.  
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3.3.2 Instrument design 
The measures used for the constructs in our research model are presented in Table 11 with a 
summary of the statistics. In order to develop the measures, we reviewed the supply management 
and marketing strategy literature to identify appropriate measurement scales that reflect the 
constructs in our conceptual research model (Churchill, 1979). For an engineer’s involvement in 
buyers’ NPD processes, we used measurement scales validated by Salvador & Villena (2013). In 
addition, we adapted internal opportunism measures from Murtha et al. (2011). Although they 
developed the measure for “internal blocking,” which is similar to barricading behaviors in our 
research model, we developed additional new measures for this concept for several reasons. First, 
Murtha et al.’s scales cannot fully explain a salesperson’s barricading behaviors in an SI situation. 
They focus on the behaviors of an account manager who, to some extent, manages and controls 
his/her team members including a domain expert (technical engineer). However, our study 
considers behaviors of a salesperson who needs to manage an engineer in a different department, 
which may require different or additional measures beyond those applicable to the information 
blocking behaviors developed by Murtha et al., (2011). Second, their scales only consider the 
transactional interaction of the domain expert (technical engineer) with the customer, ignoring the 
buyer’s NPD that inevitably requires an engineer’s knowledge sharing. Therefore, we decided to 
develop new scales for a salesperson’s barricading behaviors that could be applied to an SI situation.  
Our reviews of the extant scholarly literature suggest that no study describes inadvertent 
benevolence by an engineer and, as a result, new scales need to be developed for this concept. As 
mentioned above, a salesperson’s barricading behaviors also need to be extended through an 
additional investigation. To this end, we followed the instrument development process 
recommended by Cao et al. (2010). First, we had deep interviews with nine salespersons who were 
involved in a multichannel relationship in which their engineers directly communicated with their 
buyers for product development. With the interview results, second, we initially developed 
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measurement items for (1) an engineer’s inadvertent benevolence and (2) a salesperson’s 
barricading behaviors. Third, we pre-assessed the reliability and validity of the scales with three 
academic researchers and modified the scales. Fourth, the Q-sort methodology was adopted to 
enhance the reliability and validity of the new scales. This method looks for correlations between 
respondents about a variable. In other words, it examines how respondents think about the topic. 
This method was conducted as follows: 
1) Respondents were provided definitions of two constructs (an engineer’s inadvertent 
benevolence and a salesperson’s barricading behaviors); 
2) They were also given measurement items for each construct that we developed 
through the interviews and the discussion with three academic researchers; 
3) Using Qualtrics, an online survey tool, 7 respondents (5 salespersons + 2 academic 
researchers) were asked to match the items with the relevant definition;  
4) Based on the feedback, ambiguous and vague items were eliminated or modified.  
5) After two Q-sort rounds, 13 items (6 items for an engineer’s inadvertent benevolence 
and 7 items for a salesperson’s barricading behaviors) were used for the large-scale 
survey (see Appendix 4); 
We included two control variables that the existing literature suggests are related to our research 
model: the length of relationship and supplier dependence. As the length of relationship with the 
buyer increases, an engineer is less likely to show the behaviors (inadvertent benevolence and 
internal opportunism) for several reasons. First, he/she is more likely to understand the effects of 
their behaviors on his/her company. Second, the buyer is less likely to take advantage of the 
multichannel relationship to pursue their own interests due to altruism built through the relationship 
(Hill, Eckerd, Wilson, & Greer, 2009). In addition, we believe a salesperson is less likely to show 
barricading behaviors as the length of relationship increases because he/she believes that his/her 
external partners will not exploit the relationship to pursue their own interests (Lumineau & 
Henderson, 2012). Relational norms built up through long-term relationship mitigates opportunism 
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between a buyer and a supplier (Liu, Huang, Luo, & Zhao, 2012). Thus, we used a single scale 
(please indicate the number of years your firm has been supplying your item to the buying firm) 
for the length of the relationship with the buyer. The second control variable is supplier dependence. 
It is a well-known argument that the more dependent party tries to serve the other party better 
(Emerson, 1962). In other words, an unbalanced power/dependence relationship makes the 
dependent party more willing to accept the less dependent party’s request (Ke, Liu, Wei, Gu, & 
Chen, 2009). Thus, we believe that supplier dependence might encourage an engineer’s inadvertent 
benevolence to maintain the business relationship with the buyer. On the contrary, the unbalanced 
dependency may reduce a salesperson’s behavioral constraint because he/she may be worried about 
the loss of future business opportunities when he/she hinders the desired benefits that the buyer 
pursues from the technical channel. We measured supplier dependence with a single scale as [please 
indicate the approximate share (percentage) of the buyer’s sales of your firm’s annual sales (from 
your item)]. 
 
3.3.3 Data Analysis 
3.3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics and Measurement Model 
Table 8 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Category Frequency (percentage) 
Title 
CEO 
General Manager 
Deputy General Manager 
Manager 
Assistant Manager 
Staff 
No answer 
1 (1%) 
9 (8.8%) 
21 (20.6%) 
29 (28.5%) 
20 (19.6%) 
3 (2.9%) 
19 (18.6%) 
Total  102 (100%) 
Sales experience 
1-5 years 
6-10 years 
11-15 years 
16 and above years 
No answer 
16 (15.7%) 
30 (29.4%) 
36 (35.3%) 
14 (13.7%) 
6 (5.9%) 
Total  102 (100%) 
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Mean (S.D)  10.45 (4.328) 
Current position experience 
1-5 years 
6-10 years 
11-15 years 
16 and above years 
No answer 
33 (32.4%) 
39 (38.2%) 
18 (17.6%) 
6 (5.9%) 
6 (5.9%) 
Total  102 (100%) 
Mean (S.D)  7.72 (4.085) 
Business relationship length 
1-5 years 
6-10 years 
11-15 years 
16-20 years 
21-25 years 
26-30 years 
No answer 
25 (24.5%) 
40 (39.2%) 
20 (19.6%) 
12 (11.8%) 
2 (2%) 
1 (1%) 
2 (2%) 
Total  102 (100%) 
Mean (S.D)  10.14 (5.931) 
Share of sales 
1-20% 
21-40% 
41-60% 
61-80% 
81-100% 
No answer 
42 (41.2%) 
20 (19.6%) 
8 (7.8%) 
7 (6.9%) 
8 (7.8%) 
17 (16.7%) 
Total  102 (100%) 
Mean  29.43 (29.69) 
 
Table 8 demonstrates the characteristics of our sample. Among 102 respondents (sales 
representatives), 28.5% were managers, 20.6% were deputy managers, 19.6% were assistant 
managers, and 8.8% were general managers. Only 2.9% and 1% were staff and VPs, respectively. 
In addition, our respondents had, on average, 10.45 years of work experience in sales and 7.72 
years of work experience in the current position. Almost 80% of our respondents had more than 6 
years of sales experience and 61% had spent more than 6 years in their current positions. On average, 
our 102 respondents have had relationships with the manufacturing firm for 10.14 years. Finally, 
on average, the share of the buyer’s sales in their firms’ annual sales was 29.43% in our sample.  
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Table 9 Non-Response Bias Test 
Variables Test t df p-value 
Title  Chi-square test 9.282* 6 0.158 
Sales experience t-test 1.602 94 0.112 
Current position experience  t-test 1.441 94 0.153 
Business relationship length  t-test -0.993 98 0.323 
Share of sales  t-test 1.696 91 0.093 
* This value comes from 𝒙𝟐 test 
 
To test for bias, we compared these characteristics between the salespersons who completed 
the survey in the first round (sample size=65) and those (sample size=37) who did so after the 
reminder email. We used the latter group as a proxy for the non-response group. We tested the 
differences in terms of the characteristics between two groups through Chi-square and t-tests, and 
no statistically significant differences were observed in Table 9.  
We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis using a covariance matrix on the 
measurement model including (1) an engineer’s involvement in the buyer’s NPD process, (2) 
inadvertent benevolence, (3) internal opportunism, and (4) barricading behaviors (Table 11). Our 
measurement model demonstrates an acceptable fit (𝑥2=105.649, df=84, p=0.055; 𝑥2/df=1.258; 
CFI=0.974; TLI=0.967; and RMSEA=0.051), and the items for each construct are converged as a 
unidimensional factor because all standardized factor loadings are substantive (F.L>0.4) and 
significant (p<0.01) (Hair et al., 2010). In order to investigate the convergent validity, we calculated 
the constructs’ reliability (C.R.) and average variance extracted (AVE) (Fornell & Larcker, 1981), 
and all of them were acceptable (C.R.≥0.7 and AVE≥0.5) as reported in Table 11. In addition, 
Fornell & Larker (1981) suggested that the discriminant validity is achieved if the square-root of 
the AVE is larger than the correlation with the other construct. Table 10 reports all the square-roots 
of the AVE for the constructs in the diagonal, each of which is larger than the correlation. Thus, 
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the discriminant validity is secured. Finally, Cronbach’s alpha (α) has been used to test the 
reliability of our measurement scales. Table 11 demonstrates that all the Cronbach’s alpha values 
are above 0.7, which indicates that the reliability of our scales is reasonably high.  
 
Table 10 Means, Standard Deviation, and Correlations 
 IB OP InB NPDIn Rel Dep Mean SD 
IB 0.755      3.54 1.88 
OP -0.467*** 0.863     2.08 0.77 
InB 0.072 0.208** 0.847    3.52 0.61 
NPDIn 0.153 -0.238** 0.120 0.707   3.48 0.83 
Rel 0.004 0.025 0.013 -0.004 -  10.14 5.93 
Dep -0.150 0.088 0.069 0.170 0.081 - 29.43 29.67 
SuP 0.162 -0.043 -0.190 0.122 0.043 0.131 87.17 7.34 
*** p ≤  0.01, ** p  ≤  0.05, * p  ≤  0.1  
Value on the diagonal is the square-root of AVE 
Denote IB=Inadvertent benevolence; OP: Opportunistic behaviors; NPDIn: An engineer’s involvement in a buyer’s NPD; Rel: 
Relationship length; Dep: Supplier dependence; SuP: Supplier performance 
 
Table 11 Measurement items and CFA Analysis 
Item F.L S.E t α 
Engineer’s involvement in buyer’s NPD process (AVE=0.570, CR = 0.798) 
   Our engineers partner with the buying firm for the design of their product 
   The buying firm consults our engineers about the design of their product 
   Our engineers are an integral part of the buying firm’s NPD 
 
.746 
.677 
.837 
 
- 
.146 
.177 
 
- 
6.013 
6.333 
.796 
Inadvertent Benevolence (AVE=0.744, CR = 0.921) 
   Our engineers accept disadvantageous contract terms 
   Our engineers expose sensitive information (e.g., price, core competency) 
   Our engineers accommodate unwritten work at the buying firm’s request 
   Our engineers pursue projects requested by the buying firm without considering impacts to 
our firm 
 
.840 
.861 
.868 
.880 
 
- 
.093 
.088 
.093 
 
- 
10.724 
10.857 
11.092 
.928 
Internal Opportunism (AVE=0.717, CR = 0.910) 
   Our engineers exaggerate their needs to get what they desire 
   Our engineers take undue credit for business we develop with the buying firm 
   Our engineers alter the facts to get what they want 
   Our engineers try to make us a scapegoat for problems with the buying firm 
 
.799 
.829 
.879 
.876 
 
- 
.092 
.094 
.100 
 
- 
9.305 
10.032 
9.991 
.907 
Barricading Behavior (AVE = 0.500, CR = 0.797) 
   We suggest to our engineers that they check with us before they call on the buying firm 
   We explain to our engineers about what can be and cannot be discussed with the buying firm 
   We develop internal security measures to protect sensitive information so that it is not shared 
without our consent 
   We sit in the engineers’ meetings as much as possible to monitor our engineers’ conversation 
 
.642 
.842 
.588 
 
.730 
 
- 
.240 
.216 
 
.279 
 
- 
6.044 
4.893 
 
5.759 
.784 
Relationship Length 
   Number of years that your firm has been supplying products to the buying firm 
- - - - 
Supplier Dependence 
   The approximate share (percentage) of the buyer’s sales of your firm’s annual sales 
- - - - 
All t-values are significant at p ≤ 0.01 level 
Model fit: 𝑥2=105.649, df=84, p=0.055; 𝑥2/df=1.258; CFI=0.974; TLI=0.967; and RMSEA=0.051 
Response scale: 1= strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree except “Relationship Length” and “Supplier Dependence” 
“F.L” denotes factor loadings; “α” denotes Cronbach’s Alpha 
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3.3.3.2 Common Method Variance (CMV) 
In order to check for common method variance in our model, we adopted several 
approaches. First, we employed Harmon’s single factor test (Harman, 1960). This test uses 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) in which all measurement items are forced to be loaded onto a 
single factor (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). Only 32.8% of the variance was explained by this single 
factor. Second, we employed the marker variable test (Lindell & Whitney, 2001). The marker 
variable test checks the shared variance between the variables in the research model and a marker 
variable (also called a method factor). The marker variable must be theoretically unrelated to those 
in the research model (Williams et al., 2010). Common method variance would not be a problem if 
there is no significant correlation between the marker variable and those in the research model (Kim, 
2014). We used two manifest variables that are believed to be uncorrelated with any other variables 
in our model. They are “logistics interaction” and “manufacturing interaction,” measuring the 
degree to which a buying firm’s logistics (manufacturing) contacts a supplying firm (1=very limited 
extent; 5=very great extent). We compared model fits between the original measurement model 
(𝑥2=105.649, df=84, p=0.055; 𝑥2/df=1.258; CFI=0.974; TLI=0.967; and RMSEA=0.051 and the 
alternative measurement model ( 𝑥2 =123.302, df =109, p=0.165; 𝑥2/df =1.131; CFI=0.983; 
TLI=0.979; and RMSEA=0.036) including the marker variable using a 𝑥2 different test (Malhotra 
et al., 2006). The analysis indicated no significant difference in the chi-squares (∆𝑥2=17.653). Thus, 
we concluded that common method variance was not a serious issue in our study (Williams et al., 
2010; Lindell & Whitney, 2001).  
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3.3.3.3 Structural Model 
Model fit: 𝑥2=165.784, df=122, p=0.005; 𝑥2/df=1.359; CFI=0.946; TLI=0.924; and RMSEA=0.060 
Standardized regression weight p-values: ** denotes p ≤ 0.01, ** denotes  p  ≤  0.05, * denotes p  ≤  0.1 
Figure 4 Structural Equation Modeling Outcomes 
 
Demonstrating acceptable model fits ( 𝑥2 =165.784, df =122, p=0.005; 𝑥2/df =1.359; 
CFI=0.946; TLI=0.924; and RMSEA=0.060) in Figure 4, the results of our analysis provides 
statistically significant support for H2, H3, H4, and H5. H1 asserts that an engineer is more likely 
to show internal opportunism when he/she is more involved in a buyer’s NPD process. Our results 
show a statistically significant result for H1 but its direction is toward the negative. In other words, 
when an engineer is involved in a buyer’s NPD process and has more interaction with the buyer, 
the engineer is less likely to show internal opportunism. This result is different from our expectation 
that Hi will show a positive direction. Thus, H1 is rejected.  
We find that an engineer’s involvement in a buyer’s NPD is significantly and positively 
associated with an engineer’s inadvertent benevolence. This result supports H2 and suggests that 
an engineer provides his/her buyer with thoughtless, unnecessary support, such as accepting 
unnecessary work/unwritten work at the buyer’s request. In addition, as we expected, our result 
presents a statistically significant association between an engineer’s behaviors—internal 
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opportunism and inadvertent benevolence—with a salesperson’s behavioral constraints—
barricading behaviors, supporting H3 and H4. Finally, results from our analysis prove that a 
salesperson’s behavioral constraints—barricading behaviors—negatively affect supplier 
performance. This result supports H5 and demonstrates the paradoxical impact of SI.   
 
3.3.3.4 Endogeneity 
A concern in the estimations in our research model is the endogeneity problem, which could 
occur when an exogenous variable we select is correlated with the error term in each equation for 
each causal relationship in our research model, which violates a basic assumption of regression that 
all independent variables are uncorrelated with the error. The violation of this assumption produces 
biased coefficient estimates. If there are some omitted variables in the error term which affect the 
exogenous variable theoretically chosen, this variable would be said to be endogenous—hence the 
problem of endogeneity (Bascle, 2008).  
In order to check endogeneity for each causal relationship in our research model, we adopt the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test (Baum et al., 2007). This test examines if endogeneity exists, 
but it requires an instrumental variable which is theoretically exogenous to an independent variable 
but uncorrelated with the error term. Except an engineer’s involvement into a buyer’s NPD process 
(NPDIn), all the variables in our model including inadvertent benevolence (IB), internal 
opportunism (OP), barricading behaviors (InB), and supplier performance (SuP) have their own 
exogenous variables—NPDIn for IB and OP and OP for SuP—all of which meet the requirement 
for instrumental variables. For NPDIn, we use the timing of NPD involvement as an instrumental 
variable because an engineer has more time and volume of interaction with the buyer when the 
engineer is involved in the early stage of the buyer’s NPD processes (Parker, et al., 2008). The 
results of the DWH test are reported in Table 12 and it found no endogeneity problem except the 
relationship between internal opportunism and barricading behavior (H3). In order to solve the 
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endogeneity problem in H3, we adopted 2 stage least square (2SLS) using an instrumental variable 
(NPD involvement) (Bascle, 2008; Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2009). The result shows that H3 is not 
statistically significant ( β =-0.336, p-value=0.433). We provide an additional detail about 
endogeneity testing in Appendix 6.  
Table 12 Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) Test 
Hypothesis Instrumental Variable 
DWH Test 
F p-value 
H1: NPD involvement → Opportunism  Timing of NPD involvement 0.25 0.617 
H2: NPD involvement → Inadvertent Benevolence  Timing of NPD involvement 0.07 0.791 
H3: Internal Opportunism → Barricading  NPD involvement 3.25 0.075 
H4: Inadvertent Benevolence → Barricading  NPD involvement 0.88 0.350 
H5: Barricading → Supplier Performance Opportunism 0.07 0.796 
 
 
3.3.3.5 Alternative Model Analysis 
Models  
 
 
 
Proposed Model 
 
 
 
Alternative 1 
 
 
 
Alternative 2 
 Alternative 3 
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Alternative 4 
Figure 5 Alternative Models 
 
Our research model has three mediators between the independent variable—an engineer’s 
involvement in a buyer’s NPD process (NPDIn)—and the dependent variable—supplier 
performance (SuP). We assume that the IV-DV relationship is fully mediated by the two types of 
behaviors: (1) an engineer’s behaviors [inadvertent benevolence (IB) and internal opportunism 
(OP)] and (2) a salesperson’s behavior [barricading behaviors (InB)], believing that our model has 
good model fits. In order to provide additional evidence of the suitability of our model, we 
developed several alternative models in Figure 5 and compared their model fits (Shook et al., 2004) 
in Table 13. Generally, when the models are in a nested-relation, 𝑥2 and d.f. of fit index are used 
to compare them in order to find the best one (Hair, 2010). Table 13 explains that none of the 
alternative models are better than the proposed model in terms of model fits. Hence, the proposed 
model is accepted as effective.   
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Table 13 Comparison of Alternative Models 
Hypothesis Proposed  Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 Alternative 4 
NPDIn → OP -0.343*** -0.343*** -0.347*** -0.343*** -0.348*** 
NPDIn → IB 0.257** 0.265** 0.256** 0.261** 0.259** 
OP → InB 0.325*** 0.323*** 0.365*** 0.328*** 0.370*** 
IB → InB 0.187* 0.188* 0.167 0.196* 0.174 
InB → SuP -0.211* -0.210* -0.209* -0.262** -0.153** 
NPDIn → SuP  0.146   0.167 
NPDIn → InB   0.143  0.153 
OP → SuP    0.279** 0.203 
IB → SuP    0.135 0.267 
Model Fit 
(𝑥2/df) 
(𝑥2=165.784/ 
df=122) 
(𝑥2=164.449/ 
df=121) 
(𝑥2=164.641/ 
df=121) 
(𝑥2=161.128/ 
df=120) 
(𝑥2=158.554/ 
df=118) 
∆𝑥2  ∆𝑥2 =1.335 ∆𝑥2 = 1.143   ∆𝑥2 = 4.656   ∆𝑥2 = 7.230   
𝑥.05
2 (∆𝑑𝑓)  𝑥.05
2 (1)=3.842 𝑥.05
2 (1)=3.842 𝑥.05
2 (2)=5.991 𝑥.05
2 (4)=9.488 
 
3.4 DISCUSSION 
Our results explain that SI itself could damage an SI outcome, which is supplier performance. 
As a practice of SI, buyers try to have direct communication with their suppliers’ engineers by 
including the domain experts into their NPD processes. However, it turns out that the direct 
communication encourages the engineers to provide the buyers with excessive support beyond the 
contract. Such behaviors of the engineers result in their salespersons’ barricading behaviors which 
in turn limit tangible and/or intangible support from the suppliers to the buyers. Ironically, buyers 
experience a lack of work effectiveness and efficiency by conducting an SI practice which is 
designed to maximize the benefits.  
Our results show that all the hypotheses are statistically supported except H1 and H3. First, 
while Murtha et al. (2011) explained that account managers in the U.S. worry about internal 
opportunism of their team members when the members can directly communicate with their 
customers, we had a significant result for H1 but it was in the opposite direction. In other words, 
the members do not actually take advantage of the beneficial situation. One possible reason about 
the opposite direction could be the cultural uniqueness of our samples from South Korea. According 
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to the Hofstede index1, South Korea has a very low score in terms of individualism (19 points out 
of 100 points) compared to the U.S. where the score is 91, meaning that the South Korean values 
are much more for collectivism. Hofstede et al. (2010) argues that a culture with high collectivism 
shows high loyalty to group (organization), makes a decision based on what is best for the entire 
organization, and has a “We” mentality. Such characteristics may become more obvious when an 
organizational member works with someone outside the organization. In other words, Korean 
companies’ engineers tend to consider their salespersons in the same boat and do not take advantage 
of the new boundary spanning role even though they are involved in the multichannel relationship.  
Second, our structural equation modeling (SEM) results show that H3 is statistically supported, 
which is aligned with the Murtha et al. (2011) study that shows that internal opportunism results in 
a salesperson’s barricading behaviors. However, after controlling endogeneity, the result becomes 
non-significant. There are two possible explanations for this conflicting result. One of the possible 
reasons is that Murtha et al. (2011) measure “concern” about internal opportunism whereas we 
gauge “actual” internal opportunism. We can argue that salespersons might take a step to prevent 
the potential internal opportunism by conducting several barricading measures; however, they 
would not do so once the engineers actually show their malicious intent through actual actions. It 
is difficult to prevent the opportunistic behaviors unless the top management team is involved or 
the buyers (customers) contact the suppliers only through the salespersons. The other reason could 
be a statistical issue. Murtha et al. (2011) fail to consider endogeneity in their research. If there is 
an endogeneity problem, their statistical result could be biased.  
This study contributes to both STS theory and SI literature. First, this study will extend STS 
theory by explaining that an autonomous collaboration (i.e., an engineer’s involvement in a buyer’s 
NPD), encouraged and formed through SI, does not always guarantee a greater organizational 
effectiveness. Our results suggest that the organizational effectiveness can be achieved only when 
                                      
1 available at https://geert-hofstede.com/cultural-dimensions.html 
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the autonomous collaboration does not hurt the other groups’ work autonomy because these groups 
could impede the autonomous collaboration to keep their autonomy. Traditionally, STS theory 
insists that organizing an autonomous working group with as much autonomy as possible results in 
the entire organizational system improvement. As a new working pattern under SI, the interactions 
between a buyer and a supplier’s engineers allows them to freely define their common goal, tasks 
to pursue the goal, and the way the tasks are performed. Through such a process, they can mitigate 
social resistance that might occur during the collaboration. By preventing the resistance, this group 
can contribute to an intended organizational effectiveness; that is better supplier performance in 
our study. However, our results challenge such a naïve causality by arguing that an autonomous 
group’s collaboration (e.g., an engineer’s involvement in a buyer’s NPD) may fail to gain the 
desired benefits (supplier performance) because the autonomous group’s behaviors during 
collaboration (inadvertent benevolence and internal opportunism) limit the other working group’s 
latitude (salespersons). Instead, the organizational effectiveness could be damaged because 
salespersons whose autonomy is constrained by the engineers’ behaviors show social resistance 
(barricading behaviors). It implies that a harmony among autonomies among work groups is very 
critical to secure the QWL, which has not been addressed in the existing STS literature. While 
many STS scholars have pointed out the potential boundary problems between autonomous 
working groups, such as lack of information, knowledge, and learning sharing (Carayon, 2006; 
Cherns, 1987; Hyer et al., 1999; Molleman & Broekhuis, 2001a; Niepcel & Molleman, 1998), they 
have not touched upon behavioral constraint issues that come from a conflict of autonomy between 
work groups. Our study helps understanding the importance of autonomy optimization among work 
groups when designing SI.  
Second, our study extends SI literature by empirically proving that SI gives rise to internal 
resistance which, in turn, damages SI. We articulate that direct communication between a buyer 
and a supplier’s engineers—which is designed to derive sincere support and better performance 
from a supplier—paradoxically impedes the acquisition of the desired benefits. The extant SI 
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literature asserts that SI enables a buyer to gain the desired NPD performance through intensive 
technical collaboration with a supplier’s engineers (Hartley et al., 1997; Salvador & Villena, 2013; 
Yan & Dooley, 2014), assuming that all the members of suppliers are willing to provide their 
sincere support to achieve the desired goal. However, our study challenges such a naïve 
assumption—SI guarantees sincere support from all the members of a supplier—by arguing that a 
salesperson who is serving as a supplier’s traditional gatekeeper, may hinder knowledge flow in 
the inter-organizational collaboration when SI threatens his/her traditional role. This is an 
interesting finding in the sense that our study provides empirical evidence against a long held 
assumption in SI literature that “SI design is not the cause of behavioral constraints to SI” (Kull et 
al., 2013, p. 69). We argue that, heedless of SI design, not taking into account the role of 
salespersons in SI would give rise to the traditional boundary spanners’ resistance to SI because 
the inappropriate design (from a sales’ perspective) interrupts salespersons’ work, and more 
importantly because they might not want to lose their power in the organization (Cho & Chang, 
2008) and may further worry about their job security (Honeycutt et al., 2005).   
In the same vein, our results describe how the design of external integration, without 
considering social issues, could damage internal integration. The extant SCM literature commonly 
argues that internal integration is a prerequisite for external integration (Flynn, Huo, & Zhao, 
2010c). Accordingly, much attention has been paid to internal integration in the form of marketing-
engineering (Atuahene-Gima & Evangelista, 2000; Calantone & Rubera, 2012), marketing-
manufacturing (Kahn, 1996; Morgan Swink & Song, 2007), engineering-manufacturing (Xie, Song, 
& Stringfellow, 2003), and purchasing-NPD teams (Atuahene-Gima, 1995), insisting that an 
internal integration that performs well can support external collaboration, as well as its own 
performance. However, little explanation has been provided about how external collaboration 
affects internal integration. Our study explains that if a buyer designs/manages a technical 
communication channel with its supplier without careful consideration of the dynamics within the 
supplying firm, internal resistance by salespersons could emerge and impede the desired 
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effectiveness of the communication channel (e.g., knowledge sharing). In other words, the poor 
design for the communication channel in SI makes the salespersons interfere excessively with their 
engineers’ work, which might negatively affect the relationship with the engineers. Another 
assumption of the SI literature is that “negative consequences of socialization are the result of 
opportunistic and malicious intent” (Kull et al., 2013, p. 65). However, our results challenge this 
assumption by insisting that an unintentional social resistance could be generated by the way SI is 
designed.  
Third, our study sheds light on a salesperson’s behavioral constraints to SI. The existing SI 
literature has identified many forms of behavioral constraints that might occur in inter-
organizational collaboration. However, the behavioral constraints are associated with behaviors 
under transactional contexts, such as power/dependence (Joshi & Arnold, 1997), relational norm 
(Joshi & Stump, 1999), or uncertainty (Schilling & Steensma, 2002), which are “the result of an 
economic calculus” (Yan & Kull, 2015). A salesperson’s barricading behaviors in our study are not 
the cost-benefit calculus behaviors in an inter-organizational business but rather behaviors of 
resistance toward an unfavorable work pattern (an engineer’s direct communication with a buyer) 
so as to maintain his/her social position. It means that a salesperson’s barricading behaviors are 
directed toward the internal partner (engineer) to retain his/her leadership in the inter-organizational 
relationship, rather than toward the external partner (buyer). By interrupting autonomous 
collaboration of the internal member with the buyer, smooth knowledge sharing is limited, and 
further, the buyer experiences poor performance through SI.  
Fourth, this study introduces a new concept—inadvertent benevolence—and operationalizes 
the concept, arguing that benevolence does not always work properly for SI success. Traditionally, 
benevolence has been considered as a key factor that generates a long-term orientation in a buyer-
supplier relationship (Johnston et al., 2004; Tangpong et al., 2010), but our study shows that it 
could generate a negative effect on performance. Depending on who views it, an engineer’s 
benevolence could be viewed as sincere support (a buyer’s view of the engineer’s benevolence) or 
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excessive, unnecessary support (a salesperson’s view of the benevolence). Our results explain that 
even though an engineer is closely connected with his/her customer and commits to collaboration, 
the desired outcome through this collaboration cannot be gained if his/her salesperson thinks of the 
collaboration as being excessively benevolent. This could be another type of “the dark side of close 
relationships” (Anderson & Jap, 2005) particularly when a multichannel relationship emerges 
between two companies.  
For managerial implications, our findings suggest that buying firms should track 
salespersons’ perception about SI when the firms closely work with their suppliers. Many 
companies especially in the electronic industry try to collaborate for NPD by directly 
communicating with the suppliers’ domain experts as well as their salespersons. Through such 
direct communications, they can achieve the desired aims such as innovative product development, 
fast launch for the new product, fast problem solving, and prompt responsiveness to a change in a 
customer’s needs, assuming that the salespersons will support the buying firms to achieve these 
goals. However, it seems to not be the case if the salespersons perceive their engineers’ help for 
the buying firms as excessive, unnecessary (inadvertent benevolence). In this case, they tend to be 
unsupportive of the direct cooperation by intervening in the collaboration between the engineers 
and the buying firm, which impedes the flow of the volume of knowledge into the buying firm. 
Therefore, managers who consider SI for their NPD or any other purpose should carefully monitor 
the traditional contact persons in the suppliers to see how they view the new communication pattern. 
If it seems that they don’t like it and complain about the new way to communicate to the supplying 
firms, the managers must find the solution to mitigate the salespersons’ complaints and to make 
them accept the direct contact to the domain experts (engineers).  
As we mentioned earlier, collaboration with suppliers becomes more critical to survive in 
the market. To this end, firms should receive full support from the suppliers, which is why the firms 
adopt SI. In this sense, salespersons’ barricading behaviors could be what the firms should take 
into account and manage for a successful SI. Buying firms always have the right to choose the right 
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suppliers or replace them with better ones. If not, they must handle the internal resistance—
salespersons’ barricading.  
 
3.5 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This dissertation has several limitations that need to be addressed in the future research. First, 
we only measured an engineer’s inadvertent benevolence and a salesperson’s barricading behaviors 
from a salesperson’s perspective. It will be interesting if we could measure inadvertent benevolence 
from the engineers’ perspective and compare their perceptions with salespersons’. Also, we fail to 
capture whether or not engineers show inadvertent benevolence (IB) on purpose. Future research 
might be able to divide the concept into two distinct concepts: intentional IB vs. unintentional IB. 
Second, this study investigates a multichannel relationship only from salespersons’ perspective due 
to the purpose of our study, which is to understand how the multichannel relationship affects 
salespersons work and behaviors. However, more functional units other than just the sales unit are 
involved in the multichannel relationship, and they might have different perceptions of this new 
type of relationship. Thus, our propositions in chapter 2 may not be true for the other functional 
units, such as engineering, logistics, etc. Third, we investigated only companies from South Korea. 
Thus, our results may be different if we use data from other cultural or geological areas such as 
America or Europe. We believe that a cross-cultural study comparing salespersons from Asian 
companies with those from Western companies would result in more interesting findings.  
For future research, we can suggest several directions. First, we can develop and measure a 
salesperson’s barricading behaviors toward other functional units that also communicate with 
buying firms. Actually, some of the salespersons we interviewed pointed out that their logistics and 
quality departments also interact with their customers directly. It means that we need to think about 
a more general concept of barricading behaviors. Second, we investigate inadvertent benevolence, 
internal opportunism, and barricading behaviors from a salesperson’s perspective. When we 
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interviewed salespersons, we found that a purchasing manager in a buying firm also shows 
barricading behaviors when his/her engineer directly contacts salespersons in their supplying firm. 
By investigating the purchasing manager’s barricading behaviors, future research can provide a 
comprehensive picture of behavioral constraints in a multichannel relationship.  
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4. CHAPTER 4. Conclusion 
The primary problem statement of our study is why SI fails. We try to answer this question 
by investigating salespersons’ work characteristics and their behaviors in a multichannel 
relationship. Chapter 2 helps the understanding of how SI actually changes salespersons’ work 
routine and their behaviors through several interviews with salespersons. From the investigation, 
we understand that salespersons experience several changes in their work routine under the SI 
situation: (1) decentralized work process, (2) increasing work interdependence, and (3) indirect 
communication with buyers. Particularly, the indirect communication with buyers results in a 
salesperson’s concern that his/her engineer might provide too much support for the buyers. The 
concern makes the salesperson block the direct communication between the buying firms and the 
engineer to mitigate some risk that results from the engineer’s behaviors. Chapter 3 actually tests 
the relationship among indirect communication with buyers, an engineer’s inadvertent 
benevolence, and a salesperson’s barricading behaviors. In addition, we investigate how the 
salesperson’s behavioral constraints affect SI outcomes. Our empirical results prove that an SI 
practice (an engineer’s NPD involvement) paradoxically weakens the expected SI outcome.  
In conclusion, our answer for the problem statement we brought up as a title is that SI fails 
because an SI designer fails to take into account the social system of the supplier, particularly of a 
salesperson, that he/she wants to integrate with. The SI designer should be aware that SI does not 
guarantee full support from the supplier unless the social system of the supplier is carefully taken 
into account. By designing and adjusting the technical system of SI to fit into the social system of 
its supplying firm, a buying firm can gain full benefits from SI.  
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Appendix 1 Research on Integration in Supply Chain 
Author Technical /Social System (TS/SS) Integration Outcomes(O) Angle TS→SS SS→TS TS→O SS→O 
(Sanders, 2005) Buyer-supplier IT alignment (TS) 
Buyer-supplier integration (TS) 
Strategic performance measure 
Operational performance measure 
Supplier   ⃝  
(Germain & Iyer, 2006) Internal integration (TS) 
Downstream integration (SS) 
Logistics performance 
Financial performance 
Supplier 
in retail 
  ⃝  
(Devaraj et al., 2007) e-Business capabilities (TS) 
Production information integration (TS) 
Operational performance Focal   ⃝  
(Koufteros, Edwin Cheng, 
& Lai, 2007) 
Embeddedness with suppliers (SS) 
Supply base rationalization (TS) 
Supplier selection (TS) 
Black-box integration (TS) 
Gray-box integration (TS) 
Product innovation 
External quality 
Buyer  ⃝ ⃝  
(Swink et al., 2007) Strategic customer integration (TS) 
Strategic supplier integration (TS) 
Product-process technology integration (TS) 
Corporate strategy integration (TS, SS) 
Manufacturing competitive 
capabilities 
Business performance 
Focal   ⃝ ⃝ 
(Paulraj & Chen, 2007) Strategic buyer-supplier relationship (TS, SS) 
Information technology (TS) 
External logistics integration (TS)  
Agility performance  Buyer 
 
 ⃝ ⃝  
(Song & Di Benedetto, 
2008) 
Supplier’s specific investment (TS 
Qualification of supplier’s abilities (SS) 
New venture’s relative power 
New venture’s commitment 
Supplier involvement 
Success of radical innovation Buyer   ⃝ ⃝  
(Petersen & Handfield, 
2008) 
Buyer dependence on supplier (SS) 
Socialization processes (TS) 
Supplier integration (TS) 
Relational capital Buyer    ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
(Parker et al., 2008a) Technological newness (TS) 
Buyer-supplier relationship (SS) 
Timing of integration (TS) 
Extent of integration (TS) 
Project performance Buyer   ⃝ ⃝  
(Bernardes, 2010) Strategic purchasing (TS) 
Network relational embeddedness (TS, SS) 
Customer responsiveness Buyer  ⃝   ⃝ 
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Network-shared cognition (SS) 
(Lockström et al., 2010) Supplier collaboration readiness (TS, SS) 
Collaborative supplier capabilities (TS) 
Supplier integration (TS) 
 Buyer   ⃝   
(Cai et al., 2010) Trust (SS) 
Information sharing (TS) 
Collaboration planning (TS) 
 Buyer   ⃝   
(Wong, Boon-itt, & 
Wong, 2011) 
Internal integration (TS) 
Supplier integration (TS) 
Customer integration (TS) 
Firm performances Focal    ⃝  
(Zhao, Huo, Selen, & 
Yeung, 2011) 
Internal integration (TS) 
Customer integration (TS) 
Supplier integration (TS) 
Relationship commitment to customer (SS) 
Relationship commitment to supplier (SS) 
 Focal   ⃝   
(Schoenherr & Swink, 
2012) 
Internal integration (TS, SS) 
External integration (TS) 
Firm performance Focal  
 
 ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
(Oh et al., 2012) IT-enabled retail channel integration (TS) 
Cross-channel human resource capability (SS) 
Exploitative competence   
Explorative competence   
Firm performance  
Supplier 
in retail 
  ⃝ ⃝ 
(Koufteros et al., 2012) Supplier selection (TS) 
Supplier integration  
- Supplier partnership (SS) 
- Supplier development  (TS) 
 
Buyer capabilities Buyer 
 
⃝  ⃝ ⃝ 
(Williams et al., 2013) Supply chain visibility (TS) 
Internal integration (TS, SS) 
Supply chain responsiveness  
 
Focal    ⃝ ⃝ 
(Xue, Ray, & 
Sambamurthy, 2013) 
Supply-side electronic integration (TS) 
Structural attributes of firms (TS) 
Customer service performance  Supplier    ⃝  
(Salvador & Villena, 
2013) 
Supplier involvement (TS) 
Process innovativeness (TS) 
Product innovativeness (TS) 
Modular design competence (TS) 
NPD outcomes Buyer    ⃝  
(Perols, Zimmermann, & 
Kortmann, 2013) 
Supplier product integration (TS) 
Supplier process integration (TS) 
Time to market  Buyer    ⃝  
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External technology adoption (TS) 
Internal exploration activities (TS) 
(Peng & Verghese, 2013) Supplier integration (TS) 
Customer integration (TS) 
Clock speed (TS) 
Plant capabilities Focal    ⃝  
(Wiengarten, Pagell, 
Ahmed, & Gimenez, 
2014) 
Customer integration (TS) 
Supplier integration  (TS) 
Operational performance  Focal    ⃝  
(Ralston, Blackhurst, 
Cantor, & Crum, 2015) 
Corporate strategic integration (SS) 
Strategic customer integration (TS) 
Strategic supplier integration (TS) 
 
Demand response 
Firm performance  
Focal 
 
 ⃝ ⃝  
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Appendix 2 Interview Protocol 
 
Interview Protocol (Sales representative) 
 
Context: As you can see below, in “(A) Single-channel relationship” (traditional relationship), 
sales representatives have played a role of a sole gatekeeper in supplying firm (your firm) to 
communicate with ** company (mostly with purchasing managers-channel 1). In “(B) Multiple 
relationship”, recently, other members within the ** company (engineers and logistics) directly 
contact to their counterparts in the supplying firm (your firm) to obtain desired information 
without passing through the traditional gatekeeper, sales representatives. The additional direct 
communication channels (1) between **company’s engineer and supplying firm’s engineer 
(channel 2) and (2) between **company’s logistics and supplying firm’s logistics (channel 3) 
may affect sales representatives in various ways.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Do you think sales representatives should be a sole gatekeeper (i.e., receiving all the 
information from **company and distributing it to proper functional units within your 
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firm) for collaboration between **company and supplying firm (your firm)? Why? Why 
not? 
 
 
 
2. Relative to the “Single channel Relationship” (traditional relationship), the Multichannel 
Relationship that has direct communications between Tempur’s engineers and supplying 
firm’s (your firm’s) engineers (channel 2) and between Tempur’s logistics and supplying 
firm’s (your firm’s) logistics (channel 3) without passing through you  (sales 
representative) may give some benefits and/or problems to you and the supplying firm 
(your firm). 
 
a. What are the benefits that can be gained from the direct communications without 
passing through you for (1) you (sales representative) and (2) your firm 
(performance)? 
 
 
b. What are the problems that can be generated from the direct communications 
without passing through you for (1) you (sales representative) and (2) your firm 
(performance)?  
 
 
c. When you consider the problems caused by the direct communications without 
passing through you, do you have any suggestion to solve the problems while 
allowing the direct communication?  
 
 
3. In the Single channel Relationship (traditional relationship), you are a sole gatekeeper to 
contact with the members in the **company (purchasing managers, engineers, or logistics). 
In the Multichannel Relationship, on the other hand, the **company (purchasing managers, 
engineers, or logistics) may directly contact to your engineers or logistics without passing 
through you (sales representative) when they want to know something. Relative to the 
traditional relationship, what kind of difference does the Multichannel relationship make 
with respect to the following dimensions?  
 
Dimensions Examples Differences 
Technical 
centralities 
 Usage of devices/systems/software to 
work with your engineers or buying 
firm 
 Automation or formalization of work 
process 
 Importance of your work in your 
company 
 
Technical 
requisites 
 Required skills and capabilities  
 Dependency over other departments 
 
Technical 
proximities 
 Communication pattern with buying 
firm 
 Collaboration timing with other 
departments or buying firm 
 Cycle time to get your work done 
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 Opportunity to access buyer’s 
customers 
Technical flows  Information consistency gained from 
your engineers or buying firm 
 The amount of request from buying 
firm 
 The number or type of people to work 
with 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Relative to the traditional relationship, what kind of difference does the Multichannel 
Relationship make with respect to the following dimensions?  
Dimensions Examples Differences 
Social centralities  Your influence in your company 
 Your influence in buying firm 
 Interpersonal network 
 
Social values  Goal of your department 
 Individual goal conflicting with 
organizational goal 
 
Social 
associations 
 The nature of responsibility (work 
role) within your firm 
 Relational closeness within your 
department 
 Relational closeness with your 
engineer 
 Relational closeness with buying firm 
 
Social 
experiences 
 Uncertainty, anxiety, cognitive 
dissonance, alienation, isolation 
 Lack of knowledge required to work 
with buying firm  
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Appendix 3 Representative Quotes for Propositions 
 Representative Quotes 
P1a: SI → 
Technical 
Centralities 
“In a traditional relationship, all the information (data) is shared only by a 
salesperson...However, in a multichannel relationship, salespersons have 
a difficulty in controlling the sensitive information, such as core 
technology information and new product development plan.”  
 
“In a traditional relationship, all work is received and initiated by a 
salesperson but, under a multichannel relationship, sometimes, our 
engineer starts the project with the buying firm and a salesperson is 
involved in the project later.” 
P1b: Technical 
Centralities → 
Social System 
“Compared to a traditional relationship, in a multichannel relationship, a 
salesperson’s work range decreases and his/her authority also decreases 
as an engineer does work that traditionally salespersons did, such as 
meeting with buyer’s engineer, etc.” 
 
“Other units in our company get more information than before about the 
buying firm. So, our influence over them has decreased” 
 
“Since our engineers also contact to the buying firm, they are taking more 
decision authority and trying to show better performance to top 
management team by closely working with the buying firm” 
P2a: SI → 
Technical 
Requisites 
“One of the problems in the engineer’s direct communication is that 
engineers pursue too ideal products which are not economically viable. 
Without us, our engineers focus too much on technical issues, 
overlooking feasibility” 
 
“Engineers are interested just in how to improve technologies or product 
specification without any consideration for mass production. So, if 
salespersons do not know what is happening in the engineering channel, 
the product development time will take longer, or salespersons may miss 
the timing for mass production for the product.” 
 
“All the information in the engineering channel will be shared with 
salespersons, but we worry that missing information may exist, which 
would damage us later. The missing information could be product 
development-related issues (defect, problem, etc.) and the buying firm’s 
additional requests or work. If we work with a purchasing manager or a 
buyer’s engineer unit without knowing about these issues, we will be in 
trouble.” 
  
“If information is not shared with each other, some accidents must occur” 
P2b: Technical 
Requisites → 
Social System 
“Without sales, s-engineer focuses too much on technical issues…, 
overlooking feasibility. So, sometimes their outcomes are far from our 
company’s goal. So, we need to filter out the unfeasible projects” 
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“Directly working between our engineer and buyer’s engineer often lead 
to an unexpected change regarding product specification…we will be in 
trouble in working with purchasing. So, we need to keep monitoring 
communications in the engineering channel”. 
P3a: SI → 
Technical Flows 
“A multichannel relationship generates inconsistent information. For 
example, via their engineering channel, our engineers may receive 
information different from what I got from purchasing. For example, 
purchasing and sales decided a specific level of product specification 
during the negotiation, but later the buyer’s engineer requested a different 
level of specification to our engineers.” 
 
“Salespersons need to double-check about the projects that our engineers 
receive from the buying firm to check whether they are feasible.” 
 
“In a multichannel relationship, since purchasing and buyer’s engineering 
meet their counterparts (sales and supplier’s engineer), respectively, 
information that a supplying firm receives could be inconsistent. 
Sometimes, while engineers from both sides directly work together, some 
issues that have already agreed upon could be changed, therefore 
showing salespersons up.” 
 
“Through an engineering channel, our engineers sometimes inform us of 
the different information that is different from what we knew.” 
P3b: Technical 
Flows → Social 
System 
(inadvertent 
benevolence) 
“For sure, the direct communication between engineers would help them 
to deeply understand technology related issues, but we cannot understand 
the issues unless we are there (don’t know what is 
happening)…However, we must be involved in the conversation about 
the important issues that might be a risk to our company, such as quality 
issues, defective parts, contract-related issues, or volume issues, which 
are highly related to our work area. Even in the conversation for small 
issues, we should be involved…Therefore, sales must be a coordinator, 
controller, and filter by monitoring all of the communication between 
engineers.” 
 
“Sometimes, we receive inconsistent information and more requests 
through an engineering channel. In this case, we need to manage the 
inconsistent information and filter the many requests.” 
 
“When our engineers jointly develop a new product or technology with a 
buyer’s engineer, our engineers sometimes agree on the type of contract 
with the buyer’s engineers (MDA vs. JDA) without sales”   
 
“When buyer’s engineers directly meet our engineer to find the root 
cause of the defect of their final product, our engineer may readily admit 
the mistake, even though it is actually not our problem but their 
problem.” 
P4: Social System 
→ Behavioral 
Constraint 
“A buyer’s engineer persuades our engineers with sweet talks (for their 
personal performance) but our engineers cannot filter them. We can filter 
them” 
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“We try to control internal information by locking security on the 
sensitive information and by making the data/file share with or send to 
the buying firm through us, in order to prevent any problem from the 
information sharing” 
 
“Another solution…clearly define meetings/issues that salespersons need 
to be involved in and educate engineering…to inform us of the 
meeting…” 
 
“The experienced salespersons thoroughly build and manage their 
networks in the buying firm beforehand so that all the information goes to 
and is transferred through salespersons.” 
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Appendix 4 Supplier Performance Measurements 
Dimension 
(total: 100 points) 
Items 
Cost 
(25 points) 
- X product of X salesperson has an advantage in price competitiveness 
compared to other competitors’ items (50%) 
- X salesperson who deals with X product has achieved reductions in 
unit costs of products or services in the current period as compared with 
the previous period (50%) 
Delivery 
(25 points) 
- Late shipments of X item of X salesperson have caused production 
disruption for us (60%) 
- X salesperson willingly delivers X products on time to meet our 
deadline (10%) 
- X salesperson willingly supplies X products to meet our request 
(10%) 
- X salesperson has the capability to accept our requests to change order 
volumes (10%) 
- X salesperson sets our production schedule for X product based on 
our forecasts (10%) 
Quality 
(25 points) 
- X product of X salesperson delivered to us always meets the 
specifications stated in the contract (20%) 
- X salesperson shares the quality compliance data with us on a regular 
basis (20%) 
- X product defects have caused our production disruption (20%) 
- We issued several formal corrective actions that require X salesperson 
to address X product problems (20%) 
- X salesperson receives good audit evaluations from the buying firm 
(20%) 
Responsiveness for 
Innovation 
(25 points) 
- X salesperson willingly sends samples of X product in a timely 
manner at our request (50%) 
- X salesperson willingly participates in our product development 
processes at our request (50%) 
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Appendix 5 Q-Sort Results (7 respondents) 
Items 1 2 
1. Engineer’s Inadvertent Benevolence: an engineer’s willingness to accommodate a buyer’s request without proper consideration about 
the consequences of his/her behaviors 
  
Our engineers admit mistakes that might not be our fault 6  
Our engineers accept disadvantageous contract terms 7  
Our engineers expose sensitive information (e.g., price, core competency) 7  
Our engineers agree on unnecessary responsibilities at the buying firm’s request 6  
Our engineers accommodate unwritten work at the buying firm’s request 7  
Our engineers pursue projects requested by the buying firm without considering impacts to our firm 6  
2. Salesperson’s Internal Barricading: a salesperson’s actions to block his/her engineers from directly accessing information and/or 
persons related to the buyer 
  
We provide our engineers with information on the buying firm on a “need to know” basis 1 6 
We suggest to our engineers that they check with us before they call on the buying firm  7 
We explain to our engineers about what can be and cannot be discussed with the buying firm  7 
We develop internal security measures to protect sensitive information so that it is not shared without our consent   7 
We sit in the engineers’ meetings as much as possible to monitor our engineers’ conversation 1 4 
We don’t provide any sensitive information on sales work (price) to our engineers  7 
We reply to the buying firm’s requests even though our engineers initially received the requests 1 4 
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Appendix 6 Endogeneity Testing 
 
In our model, the exogenous variable in each causal relationship in our research model may be 
endogenous. To check whether it is endogenous, Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test is used. If 
Residuals is statistically significant in equation 1; that is,  𝜷𝟐 ≠  0,  we can argue that the 
exogenous is endogenous.  
 
Equation 1. 
• 𝑌 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑋1 +  𝜷𝟐𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖,  
Where 𝑌  is a dependent variable; 𝑋1 is an independent variable; 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 (𝜔𝑖) =
𝑋1 − (𝜃0 +  𝜃1𝑍1); 𝑍1is an instrumental variable (IV)  
• 𝐻0: 𝜷𝟐 = 0, 𝑋1 is exogenous, don’t need IV (instrumental variable) 
• 𝐻1: 𝜷𝟐 ≠ 0, 𝑋1 is endogenous, need IV and a two-stage least squares estimation 
(2SLS) 
 
If DWH test reports an endogeneity problem, 2SLS is required so as to control the endogeneity 
problem. Equation 2 describes 2SLS. 
 
Equation 2. 
 𝑌 =  𝛽0𝑠 +  𝛽1𝑠𝑋1 +  𝜀𝑖,   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑋1 =  𝜃0 +  𝜃1𝑍1 +  𝜔𝑖 
 𝛽1𝑠 is a new estimation without endogeneity  
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